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ABSTRACT
Pervasive computing systems are comprised of various personal mobile devices 
connected by the wireless networks. Pervasive computing systems have gained 
soaring popularity because of the rapid proliferation of the personal mobile 
devices. The number of personal mobile devices increased steeply over years 
and will surpass world population by 2016.
However, the fast development of pervasive computing systems is facing two 
critical issues, energy efficiency and security assurance. Power consumption of 
personal mobile devices keeps increasing while the battery capacity has been 
hardly improved over years. At the same time, a lot of private information is 
stored on and transmitted from personal mobile devices, which are operating in 
very risky environment. As such, these devices became favorite targets of 
malicious attacks. Without proper solutions to address these two challenging 
problems, concerns will keep rising and slow down the advancement of 
pervasive computing systems.
We select smartphones as the representative devices in our energy study 
because they are popular in pervasive computing systems and their energy 
problem concerns users the most in comparison with other devices. We start 
with the analysis of the power usage pattern of internal system activities, and 
then identify energy bugs for improving energy efficiency. We also investigate 
into the external communication methods employed on smartphones, such as 
cellular networks and wireless LANs, to reduce energy overhead on 
transmissions.
As to security, we focus on implantable medical devices (IMDs) that are 
specialized for medical purposes. Malicious attacks on IMDs may lead to serious 
damages both in the cyber and physical worlds. Unlike smartphones, simply 
borrowing existing security solutions does not work on IMDs because of their 
limited resources and high requirement of accessibility. Thus, we introduce an 
external device to serve as the security proxy for IMDs and ensure that IMDs 
remain accessible to save patients' lives in certain emergency situations when 
security credentials are not available.
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1 Introduction
Pervasive computing systems are comprised of various personal mobile devices 
connected by wireless networks. Some of these devices can be hand-held and 
fulfill all kinds of computational demands through intensive interactions with users. 
Other devices can be embedded into the surrounding environment or on the users' 
bodies to specifically support services with minimal human intervention. The combi­
nation of general and specific purpose devices bring rich opportunities for personal 
computing. Pervasive computing systems have gained soaring popularity because 
of the rapid proliferation of personal mobile devices. The number of devices has 
been steeply increasing over recent years and will surpass the world population by 
2016.
However, the fast development of pervasive computing systems is facing two 
critical issues, energy efficiency and security assurance. As personal mobile de­
vices start processing more complicated tasks, power consumption increases. How­
ever, these devices are typically battery-powered because mobility is a common 
theme in pervasive computing systems. Given the fact that battery technique has 
hardly improved, the increasing energy needs of pervasive computing is outpac­
ing provided battery capacity. Mobile security is of growing importance as a lot 
of private user information is stored on personal mobile devices and transmitted 
through wireless communications. Without proper protections, users' privacy will 
be violated and useful computation will be limited. Concerns rising from the energy
1
and security problems have slowed down the advancement of pervasive computing 
systems.
We select smartphones for our energy study because smartphones are the most 
popular devices in pervasive computing systems. Thus, their energy problems are 
representative and the solutions we propose for smartphones can be generalized 
to other personal mobile devices. Moreover, the energy problem on smartphones 
is more serious in comparison with other devices. Smartphones are extremely 
energy-hungry because users tend to run computationally demanding tasks on 
them. At the same time, users still have a high expectation of the battery life­
time for their devices. This conflict cannot be mitigated by slowly improving battery 
techniques alone. Software optimization can save energy and maximize battery 
usage.
As to security, we focus on implantable medical devices (IMDs), which are spe­
cialized for medical purposes. There is a lot of sensitive patient data on IMDs and 
it is possible to physically influence the patients' health conditions through IMDs. 
Comprehensive security protections are necessary to prevent malicious attacks. 
However, unlike smartphones, borrowing existing security schemes on IMDs does 
not work because of their limited computational resources and high requirement 
of accessibility. Additionally, this problem urgently requires solutions because real 
attacks have been successfully performed on IMDs with the assistance of simple 
equipment. Action must be taken to prevent further damage. We also hope our 
research on this group of specialized devices can shed light on solving similar se­
curity problems.
To help solve the energy issue, we contribute three projects. We start with an 
analysis of the power pattern of internal system activities, and we improve the en­
ergy efficiency by fixing energy bugs that we found. We also investigate the external 
communication methods employed on smartphones, such as cellular networks and
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wireless LANs, to reduce the energy overhead on data transmissions.
System power models are important to power management and optimization 
on smartphones. However, existing approaches for power modeling have several 
limitations. Some approaches require external power meters, which are not con­
venient for people to use. Others either rely on the internal battery current sensing 
hardware, which is not available on many smartphones, or take a long time to gen­
erate power models. To overcome these limitations, we propose a new way of 
generating power models from battery voltage dynamics called V-edge. V-edge is 
self-constructive and does not require current-sensing. Most importantly, it builds 
models quickly. Our implementation supports both component-level power models 
and per-application energy accounting. Evaluation results using various bench­
marks and applications show that the V-edge approach achieves high power mod­
eling accuracy, and is two orders of magnitude faster than existing self-modeling 
approaches requiring no current-sensing hardware.
In our second project, we build upon our system power modeling technique 
mentioned above to improve the energy efficiency of popular applications on smart­
phones. Specifically, we investigate email sync over 3G. According to our study, 
a large portion of energy is wasted while the smartphone receives messages in 
sleep mode. We perform a thorough analysis of different email sync techniques, 
across different mobile platforms, and we identify common energy usage problems 
in them. Then we propose a general design guideline for developers to improve 
the energy consumption of other programs on smartphones.
In our third project, we propose an online access point association algorithm 
for pervasive computing systems. It runs in a decentralized manner and is easy to 
deploy without any change to the infrastructure. This project is motivated because 
selecting a suitable access point (AP) is important to pervasive computing devices 
using WiFi. When contentions occur because of unwise AP association, the link
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quality is severely degraded and more energy is wasted on data re-transmissions.
Last but not least, the rapid development in pervasive computing is blurring the 
boundary between the physical and cyber world. This trend makes security issues 
critical because malicious attacks are now able to threaten human life. For exam­
ple, wireless access to IMDs today is unprotected and open to any one. Recently, 
real attacks have been demonstrated that a patient with an IMD could die because 
of this vulnerability. It is not appropriate to simply enforce traditional security on 
IMDs due to concerns for patient safety. 24/7 protection via standard encryption 
stops malicious actions, but also rigidly prevents legitimate doctors, who do not 
have security credentials, from accessing IMDs to save the patient's life in an unex­
pected emergency. Therefore, our fourth contribution is to design a context-aware 
security scheme tailored for heart-related IMDs. There are two novel techniques 
incorporated. One is ECG based key paring without prior shared secrets, and the 
other is an access control mechanism resilient to the spoofing attacks in this con­
text.
Specifically we address four challenging problems as follows.
1.1 Energy Modeling on the Smartphone
Smartphones already commanded 63 percent market share in the United State 
according to a recent report, and the percentage keeps increasing. Compared with 
their predecessor, featured phones, the large demand of energy has stretched their 
battery capacities to the limit. Frequent re-charging becomes an annoying part of 
daily smartphone usage. The application using WiFi is a major factor that leads 
to this energy starving. In order to improve the power consumption of this kind of 
application, it is important to first understand where the energy is drained with the 
use of WiFi based applications. Bottlenecks of the power consumption are then
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able to be identified and solved. Thus, we propose a fine-grained power modeling 
on smartphones to fulfill this demand.
There are three design requirements of our modeling approach. The first re­
quirement is fine granularity. Each major hardware component should have its 
own power model. This is the key building block to track the energy consump­
tion of active applications on the smartphone. The second one is self-construction. 
Slight changes in hardware and software configuration may lead to different model­
ing outcomes. Given the fact that there are a lot of smartphones models with many 
customization options, we require our modeling can run on the target device in an 
online manner, for the sake of accuracy. The last one is widespread use. So far 
only part of battery interfaces are capable of sensing electrical current. In order to 
make our modeling suitable to all kinds of smartphones, we do not take advantage 
of this useful electrical current information in the procedure of modeling.
The energy waste of carelessly designed applications also intensifies this ten­
sion. Therefore, energy is a crucial resource to be managed on smartphones. In 
order to manage well, it is required to have good online modeling of consumes 
power on major smartphone hardware component like CPU and screen. Existing 
solutions however either cannot achieve satisfied accuracy and overhead, or need 
current sensing support on smartphones while a large portion of them is not capable 
doing that, we propose one online self-constructive energy modeling at component 
granularity only based upon voltage information from battery interfaces. One novel 
metric, V-edge, is first introduced to construct a new energy measurement system, 
replacing current required by the traditional way. New modeling procedures are 
described to estimate battery capacity and generate energy models for each major 
component using this new measurement system. Our proposed V-edge solution 
estimates power consumption 900 times faster than previous SOD based method. 
V-edge also outperforms SOD method in terms of accuracy for voltage-sensing-
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only smartphones. Additionally, we develop kernel module Pecan for per-process 
energy accounting on the real smartphone device as the example to demonstrate 
the application and performance of V-edge approach.
The contribution of our work are as follows.
• We are the first to introduce a new metric to build an alternative energy system 
of traditional one. Only voltage information is required for our approach, so it 
is able to be applied on smartphones that are only capable of voltage sensing, 
as well as other embedded devices that are also manufactured like that, which 
are quit common.
• We provide energy transferring mechanisms between new and corresponding 
traditional energy systems, and whole procedures of component level mod­
eling with concrete examples on real hardware. The overhead of energy es­
timation on one system operation is significantly reduced to 1 second 1 from 
above 900 seconds in SOD method. The modeling accuracy is improved as 
well, comparable to current-sensing-capable based methods.
• We implement a per-process energy accounting on Android platform, Pecan, 
for demonstrating the auto and self-constructive procedures from modeling to 
monitoring and overall performance.
• We are the first to take screen pixel colors, which have a heavy impact on 
power consumption, into account when modeling screen component.
1.2 Improve Energy Consumption of Email Sync
Standby time, a battery’s life in standby mode, is important for smartphones to 
provide good power performance to users. Even though many smartphones claim
1 Could be further reduced if voltage updating frequency is less than 1 second.
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a standby time of more than 10 days in their technical specifications, in practice 
their standby times are often much shorter, e.g., only two or three days or even 
less. The main reason for such a big gap is that when a smartphone remains in 
standby mode, it stays connected to the Internet through its cellular data interface 
(e.g., 3G), waiting for various incoming events, such as emails, short messages, 
instant messages, notifications of social applications (e.g., Twitter and Facebook), 
and many other push notifications.
We study the power performance of email sync in connected standby on smart­
phones. Email is a killer application on smartphones for most users, who expect 
their email clients to keep synchronized with one or more email servers even when 
the phone is in standby mode. We measure the energy consumption of existing 
email clients on two major smartphone platforms: Android and Windows Phone 
(WP). Our results show that email sync is indeed a major drain on existing plat­
forms, and we observe that existing mobile email clients do not handle incoming 
emails in an energy-efficient way.
Based on our findings, we formulate new design principles for energy-efficient 
event handling (and specifically email sync) on smartphones in connected standby. 
Applying these principles to the case of email sync, we develop 5 new techniques, 
each one addressing one of the shortcomings we have identified in existing sys­
tems. Collectively, these techniques achieve significant reductions in the energy 
cost of email syncing. In summary, the main contributions of this work are:
• We show that email sync in a connected standby state is a major source of 
energy consumption in today’s smartphones, and that existing email clients 
are not optimized for operation in this mode.
• We derive design principles for energy-efficient event handling in connected 
standby, and propose techniques for reducing the energy required per email 
sync.
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• We implement a new email client on smartphones and show that it is signifi­
cantly more energy efficient.
1.3 AP Association in Wireless LAN
802.11 is the main communication method on mobile devices like laptops. There­
fore, the throughput of this wireless link has a major influence on the laptop user 
experience. Among all operations in the 802.11 protocol, AP association procedure 
is one of few steps determining the throughput. As the first step of the communica­
tion procedure, an unwise selection of AP hurts one laptop or client's throughput. 
This performance downgrade is usually hard to be offset by other methods like ef­
ficient rate adaptations. Which AP should one laptop pick for association? This 
question is not easy to answer in modern wireless networks where there are many 
laptops and APs, because the broadcast characteristic of wireless communication 
cause interference within the networks. The throughput of one laptop is affected 
by association decisions of other network clients that interfere with it. To improve 
throughput in wireless networks, we study this AP selection problem in a decen­
tralized manner with the objective of maximizing the minimal throughput among all 
clients. We reveal through theoretical analysis that the selfish strategy, which com­
monly applies in decentralized systems, cannot effectively achieve this objective. 
Accordingly, we propose an online AP association strategy that not only achieves 
a minimal throughput (among all clients) that is provably close to the optimum, but 
also works effectively in practice with a reasonable computation and transmission 
overheads on laptops. The association protocol applying this strategy is imple­
mented on the commercial hardware and compatible with legacy APs without any 
modification. We demonstrate its feasibility and performance through real experi­
ments and intensive simulations.
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Our main contributions are:
1. We have designed a distributed online algorithm for AP association. This 
algorithm well captures interference in transmission. It only needs to be per­
formed once on a new user when she or he joins the network, and mean­
while all existed users do not have to revoke their association decision already 
made. We have proved our algorithm is elogm competitive, while no online 
algorithm is able to do better than [log(m +  1)] [19].
2. Our implementation is practical and does not require any modification on APs, 
making our technique applicable to existing wireless networks. A light-weight 
method is introduced to estimate one laptop's throughput on the target AP 
without association, reducing the operation overhead. We demonstrate its 
practicability in real experiments, as well as in large scale simulation settings.
1.4 Secure Wireless Communication in IMDs
Medical device technique has seen a rapid development over the past several 
years. Therapy utilizing IMDs has become much easier with the help of wireless 
communication. By leveraging external wireless programmer, doctors can wire­
lessly link to IMD to collect medical information and adjust treatments on devices 
in routine follow-ups. In the near future, patients even do not need to make a spe­
cial trip to the hospitals for check up because doctors will be able to check patients' 
health conditions over wireless LAN. Therefore, both parties prefer wireless IMDs to 
other types, simulating wireless applications in IMDs. However, the current wireless 
protocols implemented on IMDs are not designed with the consideration of secu­
rity. Recent study found out that, with simple programmer equipment obtained from 
off-the-shelf markets, anyone including malicious attackers could connect and re­
program the commercial IMDs that are widely used right now. This security hazard
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put patients' lives in danger, not to mention potential leaking of private information.
We designed a security scheme to protect wireless communications between 
the IMD and legitimate external programmer. This scheme includes changes of 
system architecture and communication protocols specifically for heart-related IMDs 
A wearable device called IMD Guardian is introduced to act like a security proxy 
between the IMD and programmer. This architecture change obviously benefits the 
energy consumption of battery-powered IMDs because they does not have to deal 
with many communication messages other than medical data. More importantly, 
this change is able to save patient's life in certain emergency case that requires IMD 
to remain operable when appropriate security credentials may be unavailable. Ac­
cordingly wireless communication protocols also need to be changed accordingly 
to meet new requirements and security standards.
Two novel techniques are incorporated to protect IMDs from potential attacks 
targeting at these design changes. One is an Electrocardiography (ECG) based 
secure key establishment without prior shared secrets. This technique ensure IMD 
to securely and successfully pair with correct Guardian even under circumstances 
adversary may present. The other is an access control mechanism resilient to 
adversary spoofing attacks. When applied, adversary cannot make IMD disable 
security functionality by making fake emergency conditions.
Our IMD security scheme makes the following contributions:
1. Previous work in ECG based key agreements did not properly extract the 
randomness of input data or correctly evaluate final outputs. In contrast, we 
are the first to propose a rigorously information-theoretic secure extraction 
scheme, and evaluate its performance on resource constrained embedded 
systems.
2. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to finalize and implement a 
comprehensive secure protocol for the previously proposed architecture that
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uses an external device as the authentication proxy to protect the IMD. Be­
sides, our design is tailored for IMDs and requires no special hardware. For 
example, the key extraction scheme of IMD Guard is proposed based on the 
existing functionality of the IMD, and the wearable device does not need pow­
erful transmitter modules to defend against the adversary's spoofing attacks.
3. We perform extensive experiments on our prototype to evaluate the validity 
and performance of the IMDGuard.
1.5 Organization
This proposal is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce a fast self-constructive 
power modeling technique that works on most of smartphones. Then we improve 
the email sync in the connected standby mode on smartphones in Chapter 3. In 
Chapter 4, we present an online AP association protocol for 802.11 that improve 
the network throughput. In Chapter 5, we present a security mechanism to pro­
tect wireless communications between the IMD and legitimate programmer with 
the consideration of patients' safety. We conclude this dissertation in Chapter 6.
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2 Smartphone Power Modeling
Energy consumption is a paramount concern in all battery-powered mobile devices, 
including smartphones. Power modeling is a key technology and an effective way 
to understand the power consumption of applications running on mobile devices. 
Thus, it has attracted much research effort. With a power model, users can iden­
tify the power-hungry applications and better manage battery life of their smart­
phone [2]. Developers are able to profile, and consequently optimize, the energy 
consumption of their mobile applications [64],
Existing approaches for power modeling have several limitations. First, an accu­
rate power model heavily depends on individual smartphone's hardware/software 
configuration, battery age, and device usage [35]. Most existing work [23,28,38, 
69, 78, 81] relies on external power measurement equipment to generate accu­
rate models. This is labor-intensive and requires experts' knowledge. Since the 
power model of individual smartphone is different and slowly changing [4,35], it 
is expensive to apply this approach to build models tailored to every phone. The 
"self-metering" approach [35, 39,45] has been proposed to build individualized 
power models if a smartphone can read the online voltage and current values from 
its built-in battery interface. While most smartphones have voltage-sensing ca­
pabilities, many smartphones today, including popular models like Nexus S and 
some Samsung Galaxy series, do not have the ability to sense current. Therefore, 
the previous approach based on current sensing is not applicable to many smart­
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phones. The State-of-Discharge (SOD) approach [94] sidesteps this problem by 
using the SOD information in battery interface. It does not require current-sensing 
but has very long model generation time (days) due to the very slow changing na­
ture of SOD. This makes it impossible to have fast power model construction, which 
is often required to rebuild power models to adapt to various changes in hardware 
and software, the battery aging, and usage pattern changes (Section 2.2).
In this paper we propose a new approach for power modeling, called V-edge, 
to address the limitations of existing approaches. V-edge is self-constructive, does 
not require current-sensing, and most importantly, is fast in model building. V-edge 
is based on the following insight to voltage dynamics on battery-powered devices: 
when the discharge current of a battery is changed, the instant voltage change, 
caused by the internal resistance, has a reliable linear relationship with the current 
change. Therefore, from the voltage change, we can determine the change of 
current and consequently the power information (see more details in Section 2.3). 
The V-edge power modeling requires only voltage-sensing and thus works for most 
smartphones, and is able to generate power models much faster than SOD-based 
approaches.
We have designed and implemented a power modeling prototype based on 
V-edge. Our implementation supports both component-level power models and 
per-application energy accounting. Experimental evaluation results, using various 
benchmarks and real applications, show that V-edge is able to generate accurate 
power models, comparable to the power-meter-based approach. The building time 
is much shorter than SOD-based approaches.
To the best of our knowledge, V-edge is the first work to model smartphone 
power consumption by leveraging the regularity of instant battery voltage dynam­
ics. Prior to our exploration, these instant dynamics are treated as irregular fluc­
tuations during slow supply voltage dropping (i.e. SOD decreasing) [94]. Our key
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contributions are as follows.
• We are the first to observe that the current information can be inferred from 
instantaneous changes in a battery's voltage. We demonstrate that inferring 
current in such a manner is fast, reliable, and accurate.
• Based on this observation, we propose V-edge to facilitate the self-constructive 
power modeling on most smartphones. V-edge is much faster than the exist­
ing solution, making it efficient to (re)build power models for timely adapting 
of hardware and software configurations with minimum interruption to users.
• We present the design and implementation of the power modeling system that 
applies V-edge on popular smartphones, including power models of major 
hardware components and the per-application energy accounting.
• We evaluate our V-edge-based implementation using a diverse set of bench­
marks and applications. The results demonstrate that, given the same model, 
the error range of the energy estimations of V-edge is within 4%, on average, 
compared with those of power-meter-based approaches. The model gener­
ation is two orders of magnitude faster than SOD-based approaches.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we introduce 
how power modeling works as background. In Section 2.2, we survey the related 
work and motivate V-edge. In Section 2.3, we describe our observation on battery 
voltage dynamics and demonstrate how to infer current information from voltage 
readings of battery interface. We present the V-edge energy measurement system 
in Section 2.4 and the power models in Section 2.5. We describe the design and 
implementation of a system built upon the V-edge power modeling in Section 2.6 
and evaluation results in Section 2.7. We discuss limitations of V-edge and future 
work in Section 2.8 and conclude in Section 2.9.
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2.1 Background: Power Modeling
A power model estimates the power consumption of a system, such as a smart­
phone, based on more readily observable system statuses. Typically, the model 
is generated through a training phase. A set of well-designed programs are run 
to explore various system states in this phase and corresponding power values 
are measured at the same time. Provided system states and their power mea­
surements as inputs, various modeling techniques like Linear Regression (LR) can 
derive the relationship between these two sets of information, i.e., a power model.
It is common to simply take resource utilization as the system status, such as 
screen brightness, CPU usage and so on. As an example of such a utilization- 
based power model, consider a system consisting of only a CPU. To build a power 
model for this system, one would first design several training programs generat­
ing different CPU loads. Then one would run each training program and exploit 
some measurement tool, like Monsoon Power Monitor [12], to provide correspond­
ing power value P.
Assuming that power consumption of the CPU has a linear relationship with 
CPU utilization, a power model can be formulated as Pc%ni =  a * +  b, where a
and b are constant, {7^ is CPU utilization, and Pcpu is the estimated power con­
sumption. Here, Ucpu is called a predicator, as it is used to indicate the power 
consumption of the CPU. There can be multiple predicators in a power model. For 
example, if Dynamic Frequency Scaling (DFS) is enabled on the CPU, one may 
use two predicators, the frequency F^  and 1 /^ , to estimate the power consump­
tion. Besides LR, other techniques (e.g., non-linear regression) can also be used 
to build alternative (often more complicated) power models.
Once a power model is generated, it can be used in a power estimation phase 
to predict the power consumption of the system without requiring additional power
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measurements. For example, if the CPU utilization of a program is 25% for a du­
ration of T,  the the energy consumption of this program is E totai =  (a * 25 +  b) * T. 
More generally, one can monitor and calculate the total energy consumption of a 
program with dynamic CPU usages as E totai =  *  A T ,  where is the i-th
measurement of CPU utilization and A T  is the time interval of the measurement.
Similar to CPU, a power model can be built for other hardware components, 
such as the screen, Wi-Fi, GPS and so on. After power models of all the compo­
nents are generated, a power model of the whole system (e.g., a smartphone) can 
be built on top of the component power models. It is also possible to perform the 
energy consumption accounting of individual applications or processes, as we will 
describe in Section 2.5.
While a power model can give absolute values of energy cost, in practice relative 
values are often more meaningful to end users. It is usually hard for most users to 
map absolute energy values (e.g., 10 Joules) to what they concern, such as what 
percentage of energy has been consumed by screen or an application. As a result, 
most power monitoring tools on smartphones show power consumption information 
to users in terms of percentages rather than absolute values [2].
From the above example, we can see that power measurement is the foundation 
and an essential part of power modeling. As we will see in Section 2.2, however, 
the ways in which power measurement is currently done introduces limits to the 
power modeling's usability and applicability.
2.2 Related Work and Motivation
System power modeling has been an active research topic and many approaches 
have been proposed. Based on how power consumption is measured, existing 
literature can be divided into two categories: external metering and self-metering.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of power modeling approaches
Self-modeling? Support most phones? Fast model adaptation?
External metering X V X
Self-metering except SOD V X V
SOD approach y/ y/ X
Ideal approach V V V
Once power consumption is measured, various training techniques to generate 
models have been studied.
External metering. Most existing work on smartphone power modeling relies 
on external and expensive power meter to build power models [23,28,38,69,81]. 
Those approaches are very accurate because a dedicated power meter can pre­
cisely measure power consumption. However, they are labor-intensive and can be 
done only in a lab. Due to hardware and software diversity of smartphone, each 
type of smartphones may have a different power model. Any new configuration re­
quires rebuilding the model back in the lab again. Therefore, these in-lab methods 
are very inflexible and thus not suitable to use in the wild across a large number of 
users.
Recently, BattOr [78] extended the external meter to mobile settings with a 
lightweight design. Nevertheless, it is not easy for a layman to operate BattOr be­
cause it is not deployed on smartphones. In fact, more and more smartphones use 
non-replaceable batteries to optimize layout, so attaching any external equipment 
on them becomes difficult and even dangerous to end-users.
Self-metering. Self-metering approaches [35,39,45,94] collect energy informa­
tion from smartphones' built-in battery interfaces to generate power models without 
requiring a power meter. The battery interface consists of battery status registers 
that the fuel gauge integrated circuit exposes to smartphone operating systems, 
including voltage, temperature, State-Of-Discharge (SOD), and sometimes current 
information. The power can be calculated if both voltage and current are provided
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by the battery interface.
However, many smartphones, including popular ones like the Nexus S and the 
Samsung Galaxy S2, provide battery interfaces that are only capable of sensing 
voltages. This means existing self-metering approaches, except [94], are unable 
to work on a large amount of smartphones (the number is still increasing) already 
in use.
Zhang et al. [94] proposed building power models based on SOD readings of 
batteries, which does not require current-sensing. However, the SOD-based ap­
proach has a very long model generation time and is inaccurate due to its SOD- 
based nature. The approach measures the remaining battery capacity (a number 
from 0% to 100%) to estimate the energy consumption. The granularity of energy 
measurement is as coarse as 1% of the whole battery capacity. It not only takes 
tens of minutes to observe a change of battery capacity but also introduces large 
errors due to the coarse energy granularity.
Motivation of fast power model construction. Fast power model construc­
tion is desirable because there are many cases requiring model rebuilding. Besides 
hardware and software changes, rebuilding is also necessary for changes of soft­
ware configurations as a simple CPU policy modification may lead to up to 25% 
differences in power estimation [35]. The battery aging problem [4] also affects 
power modeling as battery capacity drops significantly with battery age. Thus, a 
power model needs to be rebuilt after a battery has been used for some time. Fur­
thermore, Dong et al. [35] showed that power models also depend on device usage 
and demonstrated that a power model should be continuously refined based on 
usage. In addition, the complexity of modern hardware may require many training 
cases to generate accurate power models. For example, Mittal et al. [64] used 4096 
training cases (for different R, G, B color combinations) to generate a power model 
for AMOLED display. If it were to take 15 minutes to observe a change of SOD
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(the minimal time used by Zhang et al. [94]), then it would take the SOD-based ap­
proach more than 1,000 hours to generate a single display model, making it almost 
impossible for end-users to build or rebuild power models on their smartphones.
In addition, the power measuring of a training program need to be performed 
in a controlled environment. In fast power modeling, short measuring time largely 
reduces the chance that the user takes the system control back during the running 
of a training program. Thus, the fast power modeling is more robust because of 
the tolerance of users' interruptions. Also, the fast one is more flexible because it 
is able to quickly suspend construction after the completion of a training program 
and resume later.
Ideally, besides accuracy, a good power model approach should be self-modeling 
(i.e., it should not depend on external power meters), work for most smartphones 
(i.e., it should not require current-sensing), and be able to generate models quickly. 
As shown in Table 4.2, no existing approach can meet all three requirements. This 
motivates us to look for a better power modeling approach.
Training techniques for power model construction. Besides LR, other train­
ing techniques can also be used for power model construction. For example, Dong 
et al. [35] used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to improve the accuracy of a 
power model by identifying the most effective predicators. Pathak et al. [69] pro­
posed to construct power models using system call tracing. They created Finite 
State Machines (FSM) for power states of system calls, thus achieving fine-grained 
power modeling. Our work is complementary to those advanced (and more com­
plicated) model construction techniques. They can be used on top of our battery 
voltage dynamics based power measurement approach. In this paper, we show 
that accurate power models can be generated using our new power measurement 
approach even though we only use basic training techniques for model construc­
tion.
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2.3 Sensing Current from Battery Voltage Dynamics
A smartphone is powered by the battery, where supplied voltage is not constant. 
The voltage dynamics of the battery are exploited here to achieve all desired ob­
jectives of the ideal power modeling approach. We show that it is possible to infer 
discharging current information from instantaneous voltage dynamics of a battery. 
This inference is reliable enough to be used for power estimation. We also demon­
strate that it is practical to detect instantaneous voltage changes by using battery 
interfaces on smartphones. Based on this, a new energy measurement system is 
introduced in the next section.
2.3.1 Battery Voltage Dynamics
The left part of Figure 2.1 shows the equivalent model of battery electrical cir­
cuit [51]. It indicates that at a certain point in time, the voltage reading V of the 
battery interface can be obtained using
V =  OCV - V c- R b* I
where OCV  is the open-circuit voltage determined mainly by the remaining capacity 
of battery, Vc is the voltage drop on the capacitance, Rb is one of the two internal 
resistors, and /  is the discharge current.
When encountering a notable amount of current change, OCV  and Vc remain 
roughly the same value in a short time frame, but the multiplication of Rb and I  is 
sensitive to this current change. As illustrated in the right part of Figure 2.1, we 
can observe a sharp edge of voltage readings from the battery interface immedi­
ately after the current change. This is known as internal resistance effect. After 
the instantaneous change, the voltage then slowly decreases due to the current
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Figure 2.1: Battery voltage dynamics. Left: Equivalent electrical circuit model for batteries. 
Right: Battery voltage curve when discharge current is changed. The deep drop of voltage 
is caused by current increasing on resistor Rb.
discharging on the battery. We define this instantaneous voltage change, Rb * A I,  
as V-edge, which is in volts. Clearly, the value of V-edge has a linearly proportional 
relationship with the change of current. If we measure the V-edge values with the 
same baseline current I 0 (this can be achieved by starting all the training programs 
from the same baseline when generating a power model), V-edge has a one-to-one 
mapping with the current.
Via this relationship, we can quickly determine the current value given the V- 
edge. Next we show that this linear relationship is reliable (Section 2.3.2) and 
V-edge can be detected accurately (Section 2.3.3). Thus, we can use V-edge to 
further estimate the power consumption and construct power models (Section 2.4).
Vedje — Rb * A /  — Rb * I  Rb * I q
Or,
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Battery Slope a Intercept ft R2
1 0.0048 103.4 0.9987
2 0.0054 100.9 0.9945
3 0.0050 103.3 0.9992
4 0.0054 101.8 0.9991
5 0.0054 102.3 0.9985
6 0.0057 158.9 0.9978
7 0.0056 154.5 0.9979
8 0.0051 157.0 0.9976
Table 2.2: Linear mapping between V-edge and current on eight batteries of two different 
smartphones, in the form of current I  =  a * Vedge +  P- R2 is the metric indicating the 
goodness of fitting.
2.3.2 Reliable Relationship between V-edge and Current
The linear relationship between V-edge and current is evident in theory, but be­
cause it requires a simplifying assumption about the battery, we seek to under­
stand whether the relationship holds in practice. To this end, we design a set of 
test trials that run various tasks with different stable workloads on the smartphone. 
Five batteries for a Google Nexus S phone and three for a Samsung Galaxy Nexus 
phone were picked for experiments with consideration of different aging stages and 
manufactures1. We ran all tests on these batteries and measured their V-edge val­
ues (in (j,V) respectively. The corresponding current levels (in mA) of these tests 
were obtained on a Monsoon Power Monitor at a constant voltage level. We then 
modeled the relationship between V-edge and current using LR for each battery.
Table 2.2 shows the regression results of eight batteries. The first five batteries 
are for the Nexus S and the last three are for the Galaxy Nexus. R2 is the Coefficient 
of Determination, a widely used measure of how well the LR is [66]. We can see 
that R2 values of these eight fittings are all above 0.99, indicating very good fitting 
results. More concretely, Figure 2.2 shows how well the regression fits the data of 
battery 2, of which the R2 value is smallest.
1new to one-year-old batteries from four manufactures
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Figure 2.2: Sampling vs. fitting on battery 2.
Those real-world experimental results demonstrate that the relationship between 
V-edge and current is indeed reliable. This provides the foundation of our proposed 
fast and accurate power modeling approach.
2.3.3 Detecting V-edge
We show in this subsection that V-edge can be easily and accurately captured by 
battery interfaces on smartphones. Figure 2.3 illustrates the curve of voltage read­
ings from the battery interface of a Nexus S, when CPU utilization was increased 
from idle to 95%. We can see a clear voltage drop immediately after CPU utiliza­
tion (thus the current) was increased. After the instantaneous drop, the voltage 
decreases very slowly, even with the high discharging current of 95% CPU utiliza­
tion (the slope will be even gentle if the current draining is smaller). By sampling 
voltage values from the battery interface before and after the instantaneous voltage 
change, we can calculate the value of V-edge. Depending on how soon we sam­
ple the voltage value after the instantaneous voltage drop, the calculation leads to
* samples 
—fitting
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Figure 2.3: Voltage curve on a Nexus S smartphone when CPU utilization is increased from 
idle to 95%. Sampling rate is 1 Hz.
Table 2.3: Sampling error of V-edge in different sampling delays
Sampling delay (s) 1-3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sampling error (%) 0% 2.94% 5.88% 5.88% 8.82% 11.76% 11.76% 11.76%
certain error. Table 2.3 shows the errors when the sampling happens at different 
times (i.e., sampling delay) after the instantaneous voltage drop.
We can see that the error is zero if the sample is taken within three seconds 
of the instantaneous voltage drop. The error increases when the sampling delay 
becomes larger. If the sampling delay is 10 seconds, the error is 11.76%. Clearly, 
to reduce error, we should sample voltage value as soon as possible after the in­
stantaneous voltage drop.
The battery interface of smartphones typically updates the voltage value pe­
riodically but the updating rate may vary drastically across different phones. For 
example, the Galaxy S2 updates ten times less frequently than the Nexus S (one 
update every ten seconds versus one per second). In the case of a low update 
rate, we should align our voltage sampling with the voltage updating. To achieve
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this, we employ the following procedure to detect battery interface parameters - the 
updating interval and time.
We first put the smartphone into idle for a time period longer than its battery 
interface updating interval (e.g., tens of seconds), then (at time tQ) we increase 
CPU utilization to a high level and immediately start sampling voltage values at 
a rate of 1 Hz. Once we detect a voltage value change larger than a threshold 
(i.e., the instantaneous voltage drop caused by increased CPU utilization) at time 
ti, we put the CPU into idle again and continue to sample voltage values at 1Hz. 
When we detect a voltage value change larger than the threshold again (i.e., the 
instantaneous voltage increase caused by decreased CPU utilization) at time t2, 
we stop sampling. Figure 2.4 describes this procedure. Then we treat A t =  t2 -  tx 
as the updating interval of the battery interface where tx and t2 are the times when 
voltage updates are triggered. With the sampling rate of 1Hz, the estimation error 
is within two seconds. Once we know the updating interval and time of the battery 
interface, we can align V-edge detection with the voltage updating so that the delay 
of V-edge detection is limited to two seconds. Thus, we can accurately measure 
the value of a V-edge.
The value of a V-edge is decided by the corresponding current change. If the 
current change is very small, it is hard to detect the V-edge. To study how likely we 
can detect a V-edge, we conducted a set of tests with different current changes. 
Table 2.4 shows the results. For each current change, we repeated the test 50 
times and report the probability that the change was detected. We can see that 
there is about a 64% chance that the V-edge is detected along with just a 7.5 m A  
increment of current value. With a 30 m A  change we achieve up to 98% and 100% 
with 37.5 m A.  On a Nexus S smartphones, 37.5 m A  can be caused by a small 
change of only 4% CPU utilization. To build a power model, we can easily design 
training programs with a current change much larger than 37.5m A.  We conclude
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Figure 2.4: Estimate the voltage updating interval and time of battery interface.
Current increment (mA) Probability (%)
7.5 64%
15 90%
22.5 98%
30 98%
37.5 100%
Table 2.4: Probability of capturing current changes
that V-edge is sensitive enough for component level power modeling.
2.4 V-edge Energy Measurement System
Once we derive the current information from V-edge, it is feasible to calculate the 
power information and further generate power models on top of it. Thus, in this 
section, we show how to build an alternative energy measurement system based 
on V-edge that is equivalent to the traditional energy measurement systems. In 
traditional energy measurement systems, the energy cost E  of a task is measured 
by power P  and time T, E  =  P  * T .  Power is decided by current I  and voltage V, 
p  =  /  * v \ For simplicity, we assume that a task has a constant power consumption
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during its execution time. The same analysis below can be easily extended to a task 
with dynamic power consumption by dividing the whole execution time into small 
time slots with a constant power consumption and using £ \  (p* * p*) to replace 
P * T .  That is, the total energy cost E  =  (P* * T*) =  (P * V* * T*), where i
indicates the zth slot.
In our new energy measurement system, we introduce a new term, the V-edge 
power Pedge, to replace the traditional power. The V-edge power is defined as
P°dge =  Vedge * V
where Vedge is the V-edge at the corresponding voltage level V  and the unit of Pedge 
is square volts. It does not matter whether the value of V  is the voltage value before 
the instant voltage drop or after the instant voltage drop (see Figure 2.1) because 
the difference between the two voltage values is fixed as Vedge. That is, the two 
voltage values are interchangeable. In our implementation, we choose the voltage 
value before the instant voltage drop.
Similarly, we define the V-edge energy as
Eedge =  Pedge * T  ~  Vedge * V  * T
to replace the traditional energy.
As we show in Section 2.3.2, V-edge and current have a linear relationship
I  =  a *  Vedge +  P- Thus, we have
P  =  i * v  =  { a * V edge +  P ) * V  
=  a * P z d g e  "H  P e d g e o
where Pedge0 <s a constant value denoting the baseline V-edge power. That is, we
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can calculate the real power consumption of a task from the V-edge power of the 
task. Similarly, we have
E  = P  * T  =  (a *  Pedge +  Pedge 0) * T  
— OC * Eedge "I" Eedgeo
where Eedge0 is the baseline V-edge energy.
During power model generation, we can directly measure Pedge but not PedgeQ- 
To calculate PedgeQ, we employ the following procedure in the power model training 
phase. We first design two tasks with constant but different stable workloads. We 
then run the two tasks to consume the same amount of energy in terms of per­
centage of battery capacity (e.g., 2% of battery capacity which can be achieved by 
reading SOD information provided by the battery interface). The V-edge power of 
the two tasks is P^ dge and P 2dge, their traditional power is P 1 and P 2, and their exe­
cution time is T 1 and T 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that T 1 is smaller
than T 2. As the tasks consume the same amount of energy, we have
P 1 * T 1 =  P 2 * T 2
( a  *  P e d g e  +  P e d g e o )  *  T 1  =  (a *  P 2d g e  +  P e d g e o )  *  T 2
Pedgeo ~  Ct * ©
p i  f p l  p 2 t p 2
where 9  =  ed9C Ti _T\dsc—  is a known constant value determined by running the 
two tasks. Note that here we only need SOD readings to derive the value of baseline 
power, which is done only once. In SOD-based power modeling approaches, every 
model training program depends on SOD readings, making the model generation 
time unacceptably long as shown in Section 2.7.
In fact, even the determination of Pedgeo can be skipped if we are only interested
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in the energy profile excluding baseline, as is usually the case for end users and 
application developers. Thus, the V-edge energy system is a linear transformation 
of the corresponding traditional method.
After knowing Pedgeo, in the power estimation phase, when a set of tasks run 
together (e.g., multiple components or processes), we can obtain energy percent­
age consumed by each task, even without knowing the value of a. For simplicity, 
let us assume that there are only two tasks, i  and j .  We can calculate their power 
percentage from their V-edge power as follows. The energy consumption of task i  
is
T  = P U T  = (a * P idge + Pedgeo) * T  
=  a * (P idge + e ) * T
The calculations of task j  are similar to task i, so they are omitted due to space 
limitations.
Thus, the energy percentage of task i  is
o/o E i  =  E i  = ___________________________ +  Q ) * T i _________________
E i  +  E j  E L 9e * T *  +  H d g e  * T *  +  (T* +  T*) * ©
In addition, we can also estimate how long the remaining battery will last. If X%  
of battery has been used by tasks i  and j ,  we have
X % * C  =  E i +  Ej
( i o o - x ) % * c  =  (p { +  p j ) * r Lj
where C is the battery capacity and is the remaining time of the battery if we 
continue to run both task i  and task j  at the same time. By solving the above
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equations, we can get
TlJ __ 100 - X  ^ P e d g e  * T i +  Ptdge* T i  +  (T i +  T i ) * e  
X  * PL9e +  PL9e +  2 * 9
If t  =  Tj =  T, we simply have Tj' =  * T.
And if we run only task i in the future, the remaining battery time will be
J-» _  100 ~ X  * Cl i P^ dge +  ® x ^n - x *(1+/»eds« + e)*r
In summary, the V-edge energy system is able to measure and estimate the 
power consumption of a system. In the following section, we will develop a system 
based on V-edge that can address common user concerns such as how much 
energy a particular application consumes, or how long the battery will last if the 
user continues running one or more applications.
2.5 Power Modeling Based on V-edge
We model the power consumption of four major hardware components of smart­
phones: CPU, screen, Wi-Fi and GPS. The main purpose is to demonstrate the 
usability of the V-edge energy measurement system underlying, so we do not intro­
duce new power models. Instead, we use existing or modified ones which are sim­
ple and able to capture the main power characteristics of the hardware. In addition, 
we describe how to do per-application accounting based on generated component- 
level power models. Power value is provided in the V-edge power Vedge * V.
CPU Model. DFS is available on most CPUs and often enabled to save power. 
Thus, for the CPU power model, we consider both CPU frequency and CPU utiliza­
tion. For each possible CPU frequency, we model the power consumption of the
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CPU as a linear function of
PCpU =  d * Ucpu "I- b
where is the CPU utilization.
Screen Model. The power consumption of a screen is decided not only by 
the brightness of backlight but also by the pixel colors. For example, at the same 
backlight level of 255, the power consumption of full-screen white is almost three 
times that of full-screen red.
Dong et al. [34] used RGB values to create a linear model of OLED (Organic 
Light-Emitting Diode) type displays' power consumption. However, because this 
model is not suitable for AMOLED (Active-Matrix OLED) types, Mittal et al. [64] pro­
posed another model to also capture the non-linear properties of AMOLED. How­
ever, the full model requires 4096 colors, leading to high training overhead. This 
neutralizes the advantage of self-metering approaches, timely model adaptation. 
Therefore, we provide a simplified yet effective alternative using the function
Pscreen — f  (P') * (t-r * P  ”1“ ^  “I” Q> * P')
where Pscreen is the screen power consumption, f (L)  is a quadratic function of the 
brightness level L, (R , G, B) is the average RGB value of all pixels, and Cr, cg and 
cb are the coefficient of R, G, and B.
The goal of this screen model is to reduce the number of colors tested. Based 
on the above function, we derive a preliminary model from only 216 measured RGB 
colors (6 x 6 x 6) by first assuming the linear relationship between the power and 
RGB color. Obviously, this preliminary model does not work well on AMOLED. 
Additionally, we measure the power of another 125 samples uniformly distributed 
in the RGB color space. Then we can obtain the power differences of these 125 
colors between measured and modeled values. Because the power of AMOLED
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gradually changes among similar colors, the difference of one in these 125 colors 
can roughly represent the average offset between measured and modeled power 
values for all colors nearby. Therefore, the final estimated power value of a RGB 
color is the calculation of the above function plus the difference of one of the 125 
color samples that is closest to this estimated color. In this way, the modeling error 
decreases to a low level, while a lot of training time is saved.
Note that when we train a screen power model, the power consumption of train­
ing programs will include the power consumption of the CPU because the CPU 
cannot be turned off to run any training program. Thus, we need to remove the 
power consumption of the CPU from the total power consumption of screen train­
ing programs. This is done by generating the CPU power model first and applying 
it in training screen power model.
Wi-Fi Model. We employ a simple model that considers the data throughput of 
both directions. A linear power function
P w i f i  —  ^  ^  P  ” f~ 6
is selected where D  is the application data, incoming and outgoing, through the Wi­
Fi interface. Similar to the screen model, we also remove the power consumption 
of the CPU in training the power model of Wi-Fi.
GPS Model. We model the power consumption of GPS based on the ON/OFF 
states, following the work [45,93]:
P g p s  =  S g p s  *  S
where / GP5 is the the power coefficient and S' is 1 when GPS is enabled or 0 oth­
erwise.
Per-application Accounting. Users often want to know the power consump­
32
tion of each individual application so that they can identify where the energy was 
spent. This per-application power accounting can be done on top of the component- 
level power models. We can monitor the activities of a process on each component 
(CPU, screen, Wi-Fi and GPS) and account corresponding power consumption as 
a function of
Pprocess —  ^  ^ P<ypu +  ^  ]  P$creen +  ^  1 P w if i  +  J y  ^  ^ P G P S  
i j k I
where i, j ,  k, I are the ith, jfth, fcth and Ith time when the process uses CPU, screen, 
Wi-Fi and GPS, respectively. N  is the total number of processes using GPS at the 
same time. Zhang et al. [94] found that the sum of all component estimates is 
sufficient to estimate the whole system consumption. Thus, we also adopt this 
assumption. The power consumption of an application is the sum of the power 
consumption of all its processes.
2.6 System Design and Implementation
We have designed a general V-edge-based architecture, illustrated in Figure 2.5, 
to run on typical smartphone operating systems. In our design, V-edge runs as a 
system service in the background, collects data on system resource utilization and 
activities, generates power models and uses them for power consumption estima­
tion. It also provides a tool with a GUI for users to review the power consumption 
information of each component and application.
Data Collection. The data collection part is designed to run in the kernel due 
to two considerations. First, running in the kernel gives us more flexibility and less 
latency compared with the user space. Second, it avoids the expensive user-kernel 
mode switching, thus introducing less system overhead. We collect three types of 
data: voltage readings from the battery interface, utilization information of each
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Figure 2.5: System architecture based on V-edge.
hardware component (CPU, screen, Wi-Fi and GPS), and process execution and 
switching information. For Wi-Fi utilization, we capture the data packets transmitted 
over Wi-Fi by intercepting the network stack. For process execution and switching 
information, we hook the kernel scheduler to collect thread scheduling information. 
We add a new system call to fetch the collected data from the kernel where power 
model generation and power estimation are done. Voltage information is only used 
in generating power models, while process information is only used in estimating 
per-application power consumption. Hardware utilization information is used for 
both power model generation and power estimation.
Power Model Generation. The system, on top of V-edge, automatically gen­
erates component-level power models for CPU, screen, Wi-Fi, and GPS as for­
mulated in Section 2.5. This is done by running a set of training programs for 
each component in a controlled way. For example, to build the power model of 
the CPU, we run CPU training programs with other components in their baseline 
power states. All training programs of a component run from the same initial state 
to ensure their measured V-edge values are consistent. For example, each CPU
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training program starts when the CPU is idle. The model generator also aligns 
runs of training programs with the voltage updating of the battery interface as we 
described in Section 2.3.3, to reduce errors of the voltage sampling. The model­
ing procedure is done without user awareness when the smartphone is idle and 
not plugged in. If the user suddenly interrupts the generation by using the phone, 
the procedure can suspend and resume later with little time penalty, thanks to the 
short estimation time of V-edge. We also allow power model updates adaptively or 
through a GUI tool described later in this section.
Power Consumption Estimation. Power estimation is done by tracking hard­
ware resource usage and applying generated models. When users use their smart­
phones as normal, the data collector keeps running in the background to collect 
the usage information of each component (frequency and utilization percentage 
for CPU, brightness level and pixel colors for screen, packet size and number for 
Wi-Fi and usage of GPS). Thus, the power profiler is able to calculate the power 
consumption of each component. By tracking process switching, we can know 
which process is using the resources at a given time. Therefore we can associate 
resources usage and thus power consumption to the corresponding process, for 
per-process and per-application accounting.
Power Profiling GUI Tool. On top of the power profiler, we design a GUI tool to 
show the percentage of the energy consumed by each hardware component and 
provide a rebuilding option to users.
We have implemented the V-edge-based power modeling and monitoring sys­
tem on the Android platform. Our implementation in total consists of 2k lines of code 
for the core components (data collection, model generation and power estimation) 
and 4k+ lines of code for the training programs.
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2.7 Evaluation
We evaluate our implementation of the V-edge-based system by answering the fol­
lowing questions. 1) How fast can power models be generated? 2) How accurate 
is the power estimation using the generated models, both at component-level and 
in per-application accounting? 3) How much system overhead does the implemen­
tation introduce in terms of CPU and memory usage?
2.7.1 Experimental Setup
Devices. We conduct all experiments on a Nexus S smartphone running Android 
4.0. We use a Monsoon Power Monitor to measure the actual power consumption 
of the experiments as the ground truth and for comparison.
Training programs for model generation. We develop a total of 412 training 
programs to generate power models for CPU, screen, Wi-Fi, and GPS. For each 
CPU frequency (there are five configurable CPU frequencies on a Nexus S), we use 
eight training programs with CPU usages randomly picked from eleven possible 
values (idle to full). Similarly, for the screen we use 347 training programs with 
different brightness levels and RGB colors of different pixel blocks. For the Wi-Fi, 
we use 24 training programs with different packet sizes and transmission rates. 
Finally, we use one training program for the GPS module.
Benchmarks. We design a set of benchmarks to evaluate the accuracy of our 
implementation on component-level power estimation. For the CPU we use four 
benchmarks running for 60 seconds at a CPU frequency of 200 MHz, 400 MHz, 
800 MHz and 1000 MHz. For the screen, we use 15 benchmarks. Each of them 
displays a different picture, as shown in Figure 2.7, for 10 seconds. For Wi-Fi, 
we use a benchmark which sends UDP packets with a randomly selected packet 
size of 50, 100 or 1000 bytes and a random packet inter-arrival time from 1 to 50
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milliseconds. The total run time of the Wi-Fi benchmark 2 is 60 seconds. For the 
GPS, we use a benchmark which uses the location service for 60 seconds.
Applications. We use six real applications to evaluation the accuracy of our 
implementation on power estimation of real world applications. These applications 
are Gallery where we use the default photo viewer on Android to show 20+ photos 
(randomly taken by the camera on Nexus S) in slide show mode, Browser where we 
use the default Android browser to read news on Bing News, Angry Birds where we 
play this free version game with commercials, Video where we watch a homemade 
video clip on the default player, Skype where we make a VoIP call through Wi-Fi, 
and GPS Status where we run a popular GPS-heavy app from Google Play [7]. 
Each test performs for one minute.
2.7.2 Model Generation Time
Model generation time is the time period to run all the training programs and con­
struct power models. It is mainly decided by how quickly power consumption can be 
measured. In the V-edge approach, as shown in Section 2.3.3, we can detect the 
instant voltage changes and consequently measure power consumption in several 
seconds. However, in a SOD-based approach, power measurement time is much 
longer because it measures power consumption by observing changes of SOD, at 
least 15 minutes [94]. Given our 412 training programs, it takes the V-edge-based 
system for 1.2 hours in total (including the stabilization time between the training 
cases which can be further optimized) to generate the power models. However, it 
would take more than 100 hours for the SOD approach to generate the same power 
models. Our proposed approach is two orders of magnitude faster than the SOD 
approach.
More importantly, the long model building time of the SOD-based approach de­
2For the experiment purpose, a stable wireless environment is expected in order to remove the 
influence of outside factors
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mands multiple rounds of the battery recharging, thereby requiring the user inter­
vention. As such, the SOD-based approaches are difficult to automate. With the 
short modeling time, our approach can be easily done without the user involve­
ment. For the sake of optimization, we can further split the whole procedure into 
small pieces and manage to complete them one by one. Each piece of modeling 
tasks just takes minutes of the smartphone idle time and consumes little energy. 
Thus, the V-edge-based system is transparent to end users.
2.7.3 Accuracy
We evaluate the accuracy of the V-edge approach by comparing its energy con­
sumption estimations with both ground-truth measurements and estimations from 
power-meter-based models. These power-meter-based models are built by mea­
suring power consumption of training programs using an external power meter in 
the model generation phase. This external-metering approach represents the high­
est accuracy that one model can achieve because its inputs are precise. Note that 
the energy comparison is stricter than direct model parameter comparison because 
model errors can be magnified.
Accuracy of CPU modeling. Figure 2.6 shows the energy consumption of 
the CPU benchmarks, including the ground truth and the estimated results of the 
V-edge approach and power-meter-based approach. Compared to ground truth, 
the errors of the V-edge approach are 1.45%, 7.89%, 9.71% and 4.18% (5.79% 
on average). The corresponding numbers of the power-meter-based approach are 
1.32%, 5.28%, 5.92%, and 1.54% (3.51% on average). The average difference 
between our approach and the power-meter-based approach is only 3.65%.
The stable relationship between CPU usage and power consumption introduces 
small errors to both V-edge-based and power-meter-based approaches.
Accuracy of screen modeling. Figure 2.7 shows the results of the screen
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benchmarks. Compared to ground truth, the average error of the V-edge approach 
is 5.77% (max 15.32%, min 1.22%) and the power-meter-based approach is 5.55% 
(max 15.81%, min 0.11%). The average difference between our approach and 
power meter approach is only 3.49%. Note that Figure 2.7 shows normalized re­
sults. The absolute energy consumption of the pictures are very different, as large 
as 3.3 times.
Our screen model is one of the most sophisticated smartphone screen models 
considered in self-metering approaches. Nonetheless, our experiments show that 
it is of limited accuracy (relatively wide error range). The reason is that this model 
relies on a small number of reference colors to correct initial estimations and pro­
vides final answers. Therefore, if a photo has an average pixel color similar to one 
reference, its estimation error is low. Otherwise, it is a bit high. The model could 
be optimized, but it is out of the scope of this paper.
Accuracy of Wi-Fi modeling. Figure 2.8 shows the results of the Wi-Fi bench­
mark. Compared to ground truth, the error of the V-edge approach is 14% and the 
power-meter-based approach is 10.65%. The difference between two modeling 
approaches is only 3.75%.
The error of Wi-Fi benchmark is relatively large. This is because our model is 
simple and served as the comparison platform of two modeling approaches. More 
predicators like packet numbers per second may improve the accuracy of modeling. 
Additionally, there are more CPU activities involved in both building and using the 
Wi-Fi model, compared with other components. Thus, some error is contributed 
from the CPU model.
Accuracy of GPS modeling. Figure 2.8 also shows the results of the GPS 
benchmark. Compared to the ground truth, the error of the V-edge approach is 
10.6% and the power-meter-based approach is 4.1%. The difference between our 
approach and power meter approach is 6.5%.
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Figure 2.6: Energy consumption of CPU benchmarks. Results are normalized relative to 
ground truth values.
Accuracy of real applications. Figure 2.9 shows the results of the six real 
applications. Compared to the ground truth, the errors of the V-edge approach are 
19.5%, 8.6%, 0.2%, 1.6%, 14.7% and 15.5% (10% on average). The corresponding 
numbers of the power-meter-based approach are 15.6%, 12.5%, 4.2%, 2%, 18.3% 
and 12.2% (10.8% on average). The average difference between our approach 
and the power-meter-based approach is only 3.8%.
The accuracy of each component model has an impact on application exper­
iments. For example, the Wi-Fi estimation errors are accumulated quickly in the 
communication-intensive applications like Skype, leading to the relatively large dif­
ference between modeled and real results. So is the case of GPS Status that has a 
lot of interactions with the GPS module. As to estimation errors of Galley, displayed 
photos are randomly picked, so it is possible that many of them have average col­
ors not similar to any of 125 references. Another reason is that the average RGB
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Figure 2.7: Energy consumption of screen benchmarks. Results are normalized relative to 
ground-truth values.
color over all pixels may not be a good predictor. We will investigate this in future. 
In addition to the individual model accuracy, errors are also introduced by the as­
sumption that the linear combination of all component energy consumption is equal 
to the whole system consumption. Besides, we do not include power models for 
other minor energy consumers such as disk I/O.
Summary. All experimental results show that the accuracy of our approach 
is very close to the power-meter-based approach. The total average difference 
is only 3.7% for all component-level and application-level power estimations. This 
demonstrates V-edge's strength in facilitating the self-constructive power modeling.
2.7.4 System Overhead
Our implementation introduces a very small system overhead in terms of the usage 
of the CPU and memory. To evaluate, we measured the system CPU and memory 
usage when V-edge is enabled and disabled for monitoring system energy con­
sumption. With V-edge enabled, the smartphone used only 2 MB more memory to 
run background V-edge code and store the collect data in memory. Such a small 
memory footprint is negligible compared with the large memory size of 512MB or
I V-edge W  power meter I I ground truth
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1GB on today's smartphones. We did not observe any noticeable difference on 
CPU usage because of its event-driven implementation like the work [69]. Thus, 
our implementation is lightweight and introduces low system overhead.
2.8 Discussions and Future Work
V-edge provides prior power modeling techniques an opportunity to work on most 
smartphones on the market. Our power modeling system is one simple example 
that is built upon V-edge. It is intended to demonstrate the implementation feasibility 
and exhibit benefits that V-edge offers. Therefore, we only cover major energy 
consumers, such as the CPU and screen. In the future, we plan to complete our 
models by adding more components, like a 3G module, in order to create a useful 
system tool.
Another issue worthy of investigation is the model optimization for self-metering
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Figure 2.9: Energy consumption of applications. Results are normalized relative to ground- 
truth values.
approaches. Usually, the more accurate estimations are expected, the more pre­
dictors a model need to consider, and thus the more overhead the building pro­
cedure has. For example, if we only use the backlight level to model the screen 
like previous work, 83% building time is saved for our whole system. However, the 
accuracy is not acceptable. We therefore plan to study how to select more efficient 
predictors to balance this accuracy and overhead trade-off.
In addition, although our implementation is based on Android platform, the V- 
edge approach is general enough and not limited to only the Android platform. 
We plan to implement the V-edge-based system on other mainstream smartphone 
platforms such as Windows Phone.
2.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a new approach called V-edge for fast and self-constructive 
power modeling on smartphones. The V-edge approach is novel because it builds 
power models by leveraging the regular patterns of the voltage dynamics on battery- 
powered devices. Different from most existing self-modeling approaches, the V- 
edge-based approach does not require current-sensing of battery interface so that 
it works for most smartphones on the market. We have designed and implemented
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a V-edge-based modeling prototype. It performance demonstrates that V-edge can 
facilitate fast and accurate power modeling with low overhead.
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3 Optimizing Email Snyc on Smart 
phones
Standby time, a battery's life in standby mode, is important for smartphones to 
provide good power performance to users. Even though many smartphones claim 
a standby time of more than 10 days in their technical specifications, in practice 
their standby times are often much shorter, e.g., only two or three days or even 
less. The main reason for such a big gap is that when a smartphone remains in 
standby mode, it stays connected to the Internet through its cellular data interface 
(e.g., 3G), waiting for various incoming events, such as emails, short messages, 
instant messages, notifications of social applications (e.g., Twitter and Facebook), 
and many other push notifications.
This connected standby state, in which the screen is off while the network con­
nectivity stays active, is of fundamental importance for mobile devices. Most users 
keep their phone in connected standby for a large fraction of time during the day. 
In this state, the reception of an incoming event (email, instant message...) wakes 
up the cellular data interface as well as the phone’s operating system (OS), to 
receive the set of packets over the network and process received data. Collec­
tively, these operations consume a significant amount of power. For example, our 
measurements show that the energy cost of receiving a small email on an Android 
smartphone is more than 14,000mJ, which is as high as the energy consumed by a
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typical smartphone in standby mode for 10 minutes. In other words, the reception 
of a single email reduces the standby time of a smartphone by 10 minutes. As­
suming the phone has a standby time of 10 days without receiving any events, its 
standby time will be reduced to less than 6 days (a reduction of more than 40%), if 
it receives 100 emails per day. This is despite the screen being off during the entire 
duration, and without any user interaction.
In this chapter, we study the power performance of email sync in connected 
standby on smartphones. Email is a killer application on smartphones for most 
users, who expect their email clients to keep synchronized with one or more email 
servers even when the phone is in standby mode. We measure the energy con­
sumption of existing email clients on two major smartphone platforms: Android and 
Windows Phone (WP). Our results show that email sync is indeed a major drain on 
existing platforms, and we observe that existing mobile email clients do not han­
dle incoming emails in an energy-efficient way. The reason is that the underlying 
protocols, and the overall design of today’s mobile email clients do not take into 
account the specific characteristics and needs of operation in connected standby 
mode: data processing is not sufficiently de-coupled from network communication 
(thus preventing the 3G interface from quickly going to sleep), memory manage­
ment and storage input/output (I/O) are un-optimized, and network protocols and 
interface operations are tailored for operations other than event reception.
Based on our findings, we formulate new design principles for energy-efficient 
event handling (and specifically email sync) on smartphones in connected standby. 
Applying these principles to the case of email sync, we develop 5 new techniques, 
each one addressing one of the shortcomings we have identified in existing sys­
tems.
• In current systems, long 3G tail times keep the 3G interface on for longer than 
is necessary. We advocate fast dormancy and adaptive 3G tail times based
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on email arrival patterns, to reduce the energy cost of the 3G tail.
• In current email clients, data transmission and data processing are coupled 
together, e.g., a final ACK packet is sent to the email server once the received 
email has been completely processed. Depending on the amount of process­
ing time required to handle an incoming email, this coupling can prevent the 
3G interface from going to sleep for a long time. We propose decoupling the 
data transmission from data processing to improve energy efficiency.
• In some email clients, the amount of data processing and memory/storage 
I/O required to handle an incoming email depends on the size of the inbox, 
leading to a particularly high energy cost for receiving emails when there are 
many of them in the email client’s inbox. We mitigate this problem by using a 
small cache for incoming emails, to enable fast email processing.
• Flash storage operations on smartphones are slow, which leads to long data 
processing times, thus keeping the OS awake longer. We show that in con­
nected standby, it therefore makes sense as a design principle to perform 
email reception entirely in-memory.
• Finally, in some clients, a new secure network connection is established for 
receiving every new incoming email, resulting in repeated TCP and SSL hand­
shakes and a waste of energy. We solve this problem by reusing network 
connections across the reception of multiple emails.
Collectively, these techniques achieve significant reductions in the energy cost of 
email syncing. Specifically, we have implemented them by modifying an existing 
email client on commercial smartphones. Experimental results show that our re­
vised email client is able to significantly improve email sync’s energy efficiency, 
reducing the average energy cost by 49.9% and up to 77.9% if we put the 3G in­
terface into sleep immediately after an email is received.
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 gives background information 
on email sync in smartphones. In Section 3.2, we present a measurement study 
on the email-sync energy cost of existing smartphone email clients, and derive 
general guidelines to make event reception energy-efficient in connected standby. 
Section 3.2 describes our novel techniques. We describe our implementation and 
evaluation results in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. In Section 3.6, we demon­
strate that our techniques can also be used to improve energy efficiency when 
receiving events in other event-triggered applications. Section 3.7 surveys related 
work before we conclude in Section 3.8.
3.1 Background on Email Sync
Similar to desktop or laptop PCs, smartphones usually use a client application to 
sync email from a server. Typically email sync can be done in one of two ways: 
polling or pushing. In polling, a client proactively connects to a server to check for 
new emails. The client can be configured to automatically poll the server period­
ically (e.g., every 10 minutes), or the user can manually start a polling operation. 
Polling has two disadvantages. First, it wastes energy if a server does not have any 
new emails, particularly if polling is too frequent. Second, because a new email may 
arrive before a client polls its server, polling causes a delay in receiving the email, 
in the worst case as long as the polling time interval. As a result, users may find it 
hard to set a proper polling time interval to balance the energy cost and email re­
ceiving delay. For these reasons, push email is widely used on smartphones. Most 
popular email services, such as Microsoft Exchange, Gmail and Hotmail, support 
push email. The Gmail application on Android supports push email, but not poll 
email.
In push email, instead of polling from a client, emails are received by pushing
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from a server. Once a server receives a new email for a client, it pushes the new 
email to the client through a previously established TCP connection. Consequently, 
the client is able to immediately receive new emails as soon as they arrive. Push 
email not only has minimal delay but in some cases also saves energy since a client 
does not need to poll a server when there is no new email. As smartphones are 
usually behind a Network Address Translator (NAT) and a firewall, they often use 
a private IP address rather than a public one. As a result, an email server cannot 
initialize a TCP connection to a smartphone. Therefore, push email requires a 
persistent TCP connection between a client and a server so that the server can 
send new emails to the client over the persistent TCP connection. For example, 
Microsoft Exchange supports push email by Direct Push [1]. A client first connects 
to a server using TCP. To receive push emails, the client uses a long-standing HTTP 
POST (the protocol used by smartphones to talk to a Microsoft Exchange server 
is called Exchange ActiveSync [10] which is on top of HTTP) request to ask the 
server to respond within a time period, e.g., 15 minutes. Then the smartphone can 
go to sleep or standby mode. If the server has new emails within the 15 minutes, 
it pushes the emails to the client. Otherwise, the server will send a HTTP 200 OK 
message to the client who then sends another long-standing HTTP POST to the 
server.
Push email usually works only on cellular networks (e.g., 3G) but not on Wi­
Fi. This is because the coverage of cellular networks is pervasive, and the cellular 
module of a smartphone can work independently from the smartphone’s Operating 
System. When the OS is in sleep mode, the cellular module remains connected 
and can receive data from the cellular network. After receiving a data packet from 
an email server (or any other servers), the cellular module will generate an interrupt 
to wake up the OS. The execution of the email client is resumed, and the email can 
be pushed from the server. In contrast, Wi-Fi networks usually have a small amount
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of coverage and roaming between different Wi-Fi networks breaks the persistent 
connection required by push email. Furthermore, on some smartphones, the Wi-Fi 
interface is usually turned off when the OS is asleep, and hence the Wi-Fi interface 
cannot receive any data. Therefore, in this chapter, we focus on studying email 
sync on cellular networks. Even on a cellular network, the carrier operator may 
tear down a TCP connection if it is idle for too long (a common timeout threshold is 
10 minutes), to release the resources allocated for the TCP connection in the NAT 
and firewall. Email clients on smartphones handle this issue by sending a keep­
alive message to the server before the timeout is reached, e.g., a PING message 
used in Direct Push [11].
3.2 Profiling Energy Cost of Email Sync
In this section we measure and analyze the power performance of existing email 
clients on smartphones. We first describe the experimental setup and then report 
the results and findings.
3.2.1 Experimental Setup
We have studied email sync behaviors on two smartphone platforms: Windows 
Phone and Android. For the WP platform, we used a Samsung Omnia 7 smart­
phone running Windows Phone 7.5. We used the built-in email client provided by 
WP. For the Android platform, we used a Samsung Nexus S smartphone running 
Android ICS 4.0.4. We also used the built-in email client provided by Android. Both 
email clients support different email services.
Our study uses two popular email services: Microsoft Exchange and Google’s 
Gmail, examining both push email and poll email. All experiments were conducted 
in Beijing, China, using the 3G network of China Unicom. Monsoon Power Mon­
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itor [12] was utilized to measure the power consumption of smartphones. We fo­
cused on the power consumption of the connected standby mode. That is, we 
measured the energy cost of receiving emails without any user interaction and the 
screens of the smartphones were off while receiving email. The disruption from 
other concurrent operations is rare in this situation, so we do not consider it in this 
work.
3.2.2 Measurement Results
3.2.2.1 Stages of receiving an email
We measured the power traces of receiving an email on the two platforms. Fig­
ure 3.1 shows the power trace of receiving a small-push email using the Exchange 
email service on Android. This email consisted of 2 KB random text content and 
the total data received was 10 KB including all headers and metadata. We can see 
there are several major stages in receiving this email. At the beginning, the smart­
phone was in sleep mode with little power consumption (about 30 mW). When the 
server pushed the email to the smartphone over the 3G network, the 3G interface 
and operating system of the smartphone woke up. We call this the Wakeup stage. 
Then the email client received and processed this email, which is called the Re­
ceive stage. The last stage was 3G tail time when the 3G interface stayed in a high 
power state but no network traffic was occurring. We call this the Tail stage. After 
the Tail stage, the 3G interface and the operating system went back to sleep. The 
total time duration of receiving the email is 18.42 seconds.
The 3G tail time is controlled by the cellular module using a timer. When there is 
no data packet transmission, the timer starts to count down. If the network remains 
idle after the timer expires (e.g., after 10 seconds), the 3G interface goes to sleep. 
If there is a data packet that is sent or received, the timer is reset. The 3G tail time
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is designed to reduce network latency. From Figure 3.1, we can see that it takes 
about two seconds for the 3G interface to wake up from sleep mode. During the 3G 
tail time, the 3G interface can keep active for continuous network traffic, avoiding 
wakeup latency.
We also measured the power trace in receiving the same email on Android 
through polling. The overall procedure is very similar to the pushing case and 
consists of the same three major stages (i.e., Wakeup, Receive and Tail). The 
difference is that, in the polling case, the operating system first wakes up itself (via 
a timer based on the email polling interval) and then proactively wakes up the 3G 
interface for querying the email server instead of being interrupted by the 3G in­
terface passively. The total time duration of receiving the email is 18.54 seconds, 
similar to the push email scenario.
We further measured the power trace when receiving the same email on WP 
through pushing. Again it consists of the same three major stages. However, com­
pared to the Android cases, the total time for receiving the email on the WP device is 
much shorter, taking only 7.24 seconds. One reason is that the WP smartphone we 
used has a much shorter 3G tail time than the Android smartphone. To confirm this, 
we conducted experiments to measure the 3G tail time on the two smartphones. 
We found that the WP smartphone has a 3G tail time of about 5 seconds but the 
Android smartphone has a 3G tail time of 10 seconds. This shows that the WP 
smartphone enables fast dormancy (see more details in the following section), a 
technique to shorten 3G tail time, but the Android smartphone does not.
We also measured power traces of other combinations for receiving email. For 
example, using Gmail email service and pulling on WP, we observed the same three 
major stages in all the other power trace curves. We conclude that it is a common 
pattern of receiving an email. Note that the stage markers in Figure 3.1 are just for 
illustration purposes, used instead of showing the exact duration of each stage. In
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particular the Tail stage and the Receive stage may be overlapped. For example, 
the 3G tail time may start immediately after all data transmissions are finished but 
before the data processing is done. In addition, in all the above experiments, when 
the email was received, the email clients on both Android and WP had already 
stored 200 other emails. Later in this Section we will see that the energy cost of 
receiving an email may depend on inbox size, particularly with WP.
3.2.2.2 Energy cost of receiving an email
To study the email receiving performance of different configurations, we measured 
the energy cost of receiving the same 10 KB email using various combinations of 
the two platforms (WP and Android), two email services (Microsoft Exchange and 
Google Gmail) and two email receiving approaches (push and poll), with an inbox 
of 200 messages. Table 3.1 shows the average results.
Our first observation was that we can see that the energy cost on Android is 
much higher than the one on WP. Aside from hardware differences, one reason is 
that the WP smartphone has a shorter 3G tail time than the Android smartphone as 
aforementioned. The 3G tail time is five seconds shorter on WP, leading to about 
2,736 mJ energy saving. In addition, as we will show later, WP has low energy cost 
of email receiving when the inbox size is small. Second, we could see that push 
email and poll email have very similar energy costs given the same email service 
and platform. On Android, the difference between push and poll is only 2% for 
the Exchange service, while this difference is less than 4% on WP. For Gmail, the 
difference on WP is 13%. This is reasonable because push email and poll email 
are fundamentally very similar: they receive the same emails and do the same data 
processing work. On Android, the default email client does not support push email 
for Gmail service and thus we do not have the number in Table 3.1.
We also found that the energy costs of two email services are similar on the
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same platform, although the Exchange service always consumes less. For exam­
ple, polling-based Gmail on Android takes 20,750mJ energy, but Exchange ser­
vice with polling consumes 14,674 mJ. On WP, push-based Gmail service takes 
6,235mJ energy but the same service of Exchange requires 5,429 mJ energy. De­
spite this, different email services might be different in implementation details; they 
are expected to have similar patterns due to the nature of the email service. In 
fact, Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) protocol has been widely used for the 
synchronization of emails, contacts, calendar, tasks and notes from a messaging 
server to a mobile device. Many companies, including Google [6] and Apple [3], 
have licensed and adopted EAS in their own email services for mail sync on mobile 
devices.
We also evaluated the Gmail application that is specifically designed for the 
Gmail service by Google on Android, which only supports push email. The last row 
of Table 3.1 shows the result. We can see that it requires less energy, compared 
to the default email client on Android. This suggests that Google does some Gmail 
specific optimizations, probably on both the client side and the server side. How­
ever, we do not know the technical details because the Gmail application is not 
open source.
Due to the similarity of push email and poll email, and the similarity of Exchange 
service and Gmail service, in the rest of this section, we focus more on Exchange 
push email.
3.2.2.3 Energy cost vs. inbox size
We measured the energy cost of receiving the same email in different inbox sizes. 
Inbox size is measured in terms of the number of emails already received in the 
inbox on a smartphone. We used the same small email of 10 KB that we used in 
the aforementioned experiments.
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Figure 3.2 shows the results using Exchange push email. Interestingly, we can 
see that the energy cost of receiving the same email on WP highly depends on the 
inbox size. When the inbox size is small, the energy cost is small and increases 
with the inbox size significantly. For example, the energy cost when the inbox 
has 10,000 emails is more than three times the energy cost when the inbox is as 
small as 20 emails. This is probably found by updating the metadata of the inbox 
database. For example, to support “conversation view”, the email client needs to 
group all the emails of a conversation thread together.
Compared to WP, Android has a much flatter energy cost in different inbox sizes. 
However, when the inbox size is small, the energy cost on Android is much higher 
than WP. For example, when the inbox size is 20 emails, Android consumes 190% 
more energy than WP. Even if we exclude the extra energy cost (2,736 mJ) of the 
long 3G tail time on Android, Android still needs 137% more energy than WP. For 
large inbox size like 10,000 emails, Android and WP have similar energy cost, with 
a small difference of 7%.
One may argue that 10,000 emails are too many for smartphones as many users 
only download a small part of their whole inbox onto their smartphones, e.g., only 
the recent emails in the last few weeks. However, with an informal survey, we found 
that some people do download a large number of emails or even all their emails 
onto their smartphones. The main reason is that they can easily search emails on 
smartphones, particularly when their smartphones do not have a data connection. 
Furthermore, email clients on smartphones usually store only email headers and 
limited text content of email bodies (e.g., up to 5 KB bytes text). By default, at­
tachments or embedded images are excluded. Thus, today’s smartphones have 
enough storage space to store a large number of emails.
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3.2.2.4 Energy cost vs. email size
We measured the energy cost of receiving an email with different email sizes. As 
previously mentioned, smartphone email clients usually download the email header 
and a limited amount of the email body for a new email. Users cannot specify the 
amount of data to be downloaded in both built-in email clients on the two platforms. 
Based on our observation, the email client on WP receives very limited email data, 
about only 10 KB including all email headers. The email client on Android can 
receive up-to several hundred KB of data (see more details in Section 3.2.6), more 
suitable for testing. Consequently, we only measured the energy cost of receiving 
an email with different sizes on Android.
Figure 3.3 shows the results with an inbox of 200 emails. The email size is 
defined as the total received data size if the email is completely received, includ­
ing email content, headers and metadata. We decided the size of an email using 
Outlook email client on a PC. Outlook email client can download all the email data 
and show the received data size. We can see that the energy cost increases as the 
email size gets larger but the difference is small, not proportional to the difference in 
email sizes. For example, when the email size is changed from 11KB to 107KB, an 
increase of 873%, the increase in energy cost is only 31 %. This is for two reasons. 
First, the email size mainly contributes to the energy cost of receiving and process­
ing the data, which is only a small part of the total energy consumption. Second, 
for large emails the Android email client does not receive all the email data. For 
instance, an email with a size of 500 KB and an email with a size of 1,000 KB have 
similar amounts of data written to the flash storage (336 KB vs. 340 KB).
3.2.2.5 Network activities in receiving an email
To find out what happened behind the energy cost, we profiled the network activities 
of the email clients when receiving an email. To do that, we captured the network
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data packets received and sent by the email clients. On Android, we used Tcpdump 
to save all the network packets for offline analysis. For WP, we did not have a 
tool to capture packets. Thus, instead of using 3G, we conducted experiments on 
receiving emails over Wi-Fi. To make push email work over Wi-Fi, we kept the 
smartphone on at all times so that it could receive emails pushed from the email 
server. Then we used Wireshark on a laptop to capture all network packets of the 
smartphone transmitted in the air.
Figure 3.4 shows the packets (excluding TCP ACKs) transmitted in receiving 
the small email sized 10KB on WP pushed from the Exchange server. Basically, 
the email client first received notification of the new incoming email from the server 
over the previously established TCP connection. Then it started to fetch the email 
from the server and processed it. After that, the client sent out a PING message 
packet to the server to wait for the next incoming new email.
We can see that there is a network-idle time period between the PING packet 
and the prior burst data transmission. During this time period, the email client is 
processing the received email. We found that this processing time increases with 
inbox size. As shown in Table 3.2, with an inbox size of 200 emails, it was 0.5 
seconds but increased to 10 seconds when the inbox had 10,000 emails.
Figure 3.5 shows the network packets transmitted on Android when receiving 
the same push email from the same Exchange server. Compared to WP, the net­
work activities on Android are different as follows. First, instead of using the same 
TCP connection to fetch a new email, after receiving a notification over the exist­
ing TCP connection, the Android email client establishes a new TCP connection to 
the email server to receive the new email. Doing so introduces some overhead on 
TCP and SSL handshakes between the client and the server, where 12data pack­
ets (6.9KB in total) are transmitted. Second, on Android there are two network-idle 
time periods. One is between the email sync request sent from the client to the
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server and the server’s reply. The other one is after receiving the burst event data 
and before the final PING message sent from the client to the server. However, 
unlike WP, the network-idle time periods do not depend on inbox size. Table 3.2 
also shows the total network-idle time on Android. It bears no obvious relationship 
to the inbox size, ranging from 3 seconds to 4.6 seconds (3.6 seconds on average).
3.2.2.6 Storage activities in receiving an email
Besides the network activities, we also profiled the storage activities in receiving 
an email. For Android, we developed a tool to intercept the storage access APIs 
(e.g., file reading and writing) to capture all the flash-storage operations of the email 
client. For WP, we couldn’t develop such a tool due to the limited programmabil­
ity offered by Windows Phone. Therefore, we only conducted the flash-storage 
experiments on Android.
Table 3.3 shows the total amount of data written to flash storage for different 
incoming email sizes. We can see that the amount of data written to flash storage 
increases with email size. This is because the email client needs to write the re­
ceived email data into the inbox database. Thus, more data were written to flash 
storage for larger email. However, when the email is very large, the data amount 
written to flash storage does not increase any more. This is because the Android 
email client limits the maximum data received for emails. Unfortunately it does not 
provide an option for users to configure such a behavior.
The results show that the Android email client immediately writes received email 
data onto flash storage. All flash operations in receiving an email were distributed 
in a time period of one to two seconds, each writing a small amount of data. As 
we will show in Section 4.3, small flash writes are time and energy expensive and 
should be avoided in receiving emails.
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3.2.2.7 Energy distribution
Finally we studied how the total energy cost of receiving an email is distributed in the 
three stages of the power curves: Wakeup stage for the 3G interface and operating 
system to wake up, Receive stage for the email receiving and processing, and Tail 
stage for the 3G tail time. We denote the time duration of the Wakeup stage as the 
time period between the time when the smartphone wakes up and the time before 
receiving the notification packet from the server. We define the time duration of the 
Tail stage as the time period between the time when the last packet is transmitted 
and the time when the smartphone goes to sleep again. We treat the rest of time 
as the time duration of the Receive stage.
Figure 3.6 shows the results. We can see that the Wakeup stage takes stable 
and fixed energy costs on both WP (907-936 mJ) and Android (979-1,022 mJ) no 
matter how big the inbox is. The energy cost of the Tail stage is also quite stable 
on the two platforms. On WP, the Tail stage takes 2,419-3,427 mJ (2,866 mJ on 
average) of energy but on Android it takes 5,832-6,307 mJ (5,962 mJ on average) 
of energy, due to the difference of 3G tail time on the two platforms. Different from 
the Wakeup stage and the Tail stage, the energy cost of Receive stage depends on 
the inbox size. Particularly for WP, the energy cost increases significantly with the 
inbox size, from only 144mJwhen the inbox size is 20 to 10,944 mJ when the inbox 
size is 10,000. For Android, the numbers are relatively flat: 7,387 mJ for inbox of 
20 and 11,002 mJ for inbox of 10,000.
In addition, we can see that the Receive stage and Tail stage take more energy 
than the Wakeup stage. The Receive stage takes 30% - 71% (49% on average) of 
the total energy cost on WP, and takes 52% - 61% (57% on average) of the total 
energy cost on Android. For the Tail stage, it takes 22% - 51% (38% on average) 
of the total energy on WP, and takes 33% - 42% (37% on average) of the total 
energy cost on Android. Therefore, to reduce the energy cost of receiving emails,
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we should focus on optimizing these two stages.
3.2.3 Summary of Findings
Based on above measurement results in above Section, we can see that the exist­
ing smartphone email clients are not energy efficient in following aspects.
First, the 3G tail time takes a large part of the total time of receiving an email. 
The 3G tail time is designed to reduce the network latency for burst data trans­
missions. However, the inter-arrival time of incoming events is not short in the 
connected standby mode. Occasional transmissions make the 3G tail time unnec­
essary in most cases. Therefore, the energy is wasted on the 3G interface.
Second, the data transmission and processing are coupled together, leading to 
more wasted energy. Receiving an email is composed of the following steps: first 
is communicating with the server to receive some data, processing the received 
data locally, and then communicating with the server again. The second step of 
the communication resets the 3G tail timer, causing the 3G interface on for longer 
time and thus wasting energy.
Third, the email clients write data onto the flash storage when receiving an email. 
As we will show in Section 4.3, flash operations are energy-expensive and should 
be batched together to save energy.
Fourth, when the inbox size is large, receiving an email costs more energy than 
small inbox case. It is desirable to reduce the energy cost for a large inbox size.
Finally, on Android, the email client always initializes a new TCP connection to 
the server to receive an email. Doing so wastes energy due to the duplicated TCP 
and SSL handshakes.
Next in Section 4 we propose techniques to address above energy inefficiency 
and reduce the energy cost of receiving email. Those techniques can also be used 
as general design guidelines to improve power performance of other applications
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Figure 3.1: Power trace of receiving a push email on Android using Exchange email service 
Table 3.1: Average energy cost of receiving a small email with various configurations
Configuration Energy Cost (mJ)
Android + Exchange + Push 14,976
Android + Exchange + Poll 14,674
Android + Gmail + Push N/A
Android + Gmail + Poll 20,750
WP + Exchange + Push 5,429
WP + Exchange + Poll 5,659
WP + Gmail + Push 6,235
WP + Gmail + Poll 7,027
Android + Gmail App (Push) 12,931
on smartphones.
3.3 Reducing Energy Cost of Email Sync
From Figure 3.1, we can see that the baseline power, when the system is active but 
idle (e.g., during the 3G tail time), can reach over 200 mW. This means that once 
the 3G interface and the OS wake up, the smartphone will consume a large amount 
of energy even without doing any tasks. Therefore, to reduce the energy cost of 
receiving an email, one effective way is to shorten the total time period of email 
receiving as much as possible. In this section we show how we achieve it with five
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Figure 3.2: Energy cost of receiving a push email of 10 KB using Exchange service with 
different inbox sizes (five trials per experiment)
Table 3.2: Network idle time during email receiving
Inbox size (number of emails) Network idle time (seconds)W P Android
20 0.4 3.5
200 0.5 4.6
1,000 0.9 3.0
4,000 3.5 3.4
10,000 10.0 3.5
techniques, each of them addressing one energy inefficiency issue we observed in 
Section 3.
3.3.0.1 Reducing 3G Tail Time
The 3G tail time causes a lot of energy to be wasted in receiving emails. After a new 
email is received and processed, the 3G interface enters the tail state in which the 
whole smartphone does nothing but consume energy. While the 3G tail is designed 
to save energy and reduce latency in continuous network data transmissions, it is 
not suitable for the connected standby mode. In the connected standby mode, the 
events received by a smartphone are pretty sparse, often arriving at a time period 
much longer than 3G tail time. Thus, it is likely that the 3G tail time cannot cover 
multiple events. To verify it, we measured the inter-arrival time of the emails of four 
researchers at Microsoft Research Asia. In total 31,303 emails, only 1.3% emails 
come within a ten-second time frame of previous one. Therefore, a 3G tail time
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Figure 3.3: Energy cost of receiving an email with various email sizes (five trials per exper­
iment)
Table 3.3: Data size written to flash in email receiving
Email size (KB) 10 50 100 500 1,000
Data size (KB) 139 156 188 336 340
of ten seconds rarely covers more than one incoming emails and thus wastes a 
considerable amount of energy.
The problem of wasted energy caused by the 3G tail time has already been 
identified recently. To solve the problem, a technique called fast dormancy [13] has 
been proposed to force the 3G interface to quickly sleep faster than before, e.g., five 
seconds rather than ten seconds. However, rapid dormancy increases the signaling 
overhead of cellular networks if the sleep timers are too short. In fact, in the early 
days of fast dormancy, some popular smartphones using aggressive timers have 
led to severe signaling channel congestion [8]. Later the network-controlled fast 
dormancy was adopted by 3GPP in Release 8 [1] to reduce the signaling overhead 
caused by the fast dormancy. Researchers have proposed to adaptively use the
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Figure 3.4: Network packets transmitted in receiving a push email using Exchange service 
on WP
fast dormancy based on application traffic patterns [18,30,72,73]. For example, 
in [72] the authors proposed a tail optimization protocol based on fast dormancy. 
In [18] a system has been built to predict the end of communication to invoke the 
fast dormancy without increasing the network signaling load.
We advocate for the fast dormancy to be used in connected standby. As shown 
by our measurement results in Section 3, the WP smartphone we used enables 
fast dormancy and thus has a shorter 3G tail time than the Android smartphone. 
We also agree with the authors in [72] and [18] for adaptive 3G tail time based on 
application traffic patterns.
In particular, because that network events are very sparse in the connected 
standby, 3G tail time still wastes energy even if fast dormancy is enabled. In an 
ideal case, the 3G interface should go to sleep immediately after the event receiv­
ing is finished. However, to avoid interference with other applications, individual 
applications must not directly control the 3G tail time. Instead, we propose that the
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Figure 3.5: Network packets transmitted in receiving a push email using Exchange service 
(the same one used for Fig. 3.4) on Android
OS should provide a global service that collects the network usage information of 
all the applications running in connected standby, decides the shortest length of 
3G tail time, and collaborates with the cellular network to put the 3G interface into 
sleep mode as quickly as possible, minimizing the energy waste of 3G tail time. 
Due to the long inter-arrival time of network events in the connected standby, the 
signaling overhead is small.
3.3.1 Decoupling Data Transmission from Data Processing
Due to the 3G tail effect, data transmission should be decoupled from data process­
ing to save energy. In an ideal case, an email client should first finish all network 
communication with a server and then process the received data, so that the 3G 
interface is able to go to sleep as soon as possible. In receiving a push email,
i .  >
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there are three steps: 1) fetching the email content from the server, 2) process­
ing the received email locally (e.g., updating the inbox database), and 3) telling 
the server that it is ready to receive the next push email and then go to sleep. As 
we show in Section 3, in such a “transmission-processing-transmission” process, 
existing email clients do the second transmission part after the processing part is 
finished, which seems a natural design choice due to the sequential nature but is 
not energy efficient. During the data processing part, the 3G interface stays awake 
unnecessarily and the second data transmission resets the 3G tail timer, wasting 
energy. For example, assume that the data processing needs two seconds and 
the power is 200 mW, 400 mJ energy will be wasted. Therefore, to save energy, 
an email client should batch all its data transmissions together. It should first fetch 
new email content and immediately tell the server that it is ready to receive the next 
push email before waiting for the email processing to be finished.
Batching all data transmissions together may be difficult if a network protocol 
depends on the result of data processing. For example, if an email server requires 
an email client to tell whether the email processing is successful or not, the email 
client cannot start the second data transmission part before the data processing 
part is finished. We propose to solve this problem using speculative execution [50]. 
That is, we predict the result of the data processing part and send the predicted 
result to the server without waiting for the data processing part to be finished. If we 
find that the predicted result is wrong after the data processing part is finished, we 
can re-sync with the server. If we can correctly predict the data processing results 
with a high probability, we can still batch data transmissions together to reduce the 
3G tail effect. To determine feasibility, we conducted an experiment to measure the 
failure rate of receiving and processing 10,000 emails. We found that all the 10,000 
emails were successfully processed without any error. This indicates that the email 
receiving is reliable and we can correctly predict the email processing results with a
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high probability. Therefore, it is possible to leverage speculative execution to save 
energy. Furthermore, for Microsoft Exchange and Gmail services on smartphones, 
they do not depend on the email processing results. Thus, we can easily batch 
data transmissions and decouple them from data processing.
3.3.2 In-Memory Data Processing
Writing data to flash storage is slower than writing data to memory, particularly 
for small, random data writes [24,30,47]. We conducted experiments to measure 
the performance difference of the flash storage and memory. We used a Nexus S 
smartphone running Android 4.0.4. We inserted an email of 270 bytes into a SQLite 
database for 1,000 times and measured averaged energy and time cost of inserting 
one email. We used the SQLite database because the Gmail client and the default 
email client on Android use SQLite to store emails. The SQLite library provides two 
types of APIs to write data into a database: individual writes and batching multiple 
writes together as a transaction. Thus, we measured the performance of writing 
the 1,000 emails one by one and batching the 1,000 email writes together.
Table 3.4 shows the results. For individual writing, when the entire database 
was loaded in memory, the average energy and time cost per email was just 1 mJ 
and 1 ms. When the database was stored on the flash storage, the corresponding 
energy and time costs increased to 32 mJ and 55 ms. For batching writes, when 
the database was loaded in memory, the average energy and time costs were 0.59 
mJ and 0.58 ms. When the database was stored on flash storage, the correspond­
ing figures were 0.64 mJ and 0.65 ms. Those results show that for small writes, 
flash storage costs much more energy (32 times) and takes much more time (55 
times) than memory. However, for writing a large amount of data together, the 
flash storage and memory have similar performance in terms of the energy and 
time costs.
67
Therefore, to reduce the energy and time cost in email receiving, an email client 
should not issue many small flash writes. Instead, it should batch multiple small 
writes together and commit them to flash in a batch. As mentioned before, email 
clients on smartphones only download email headers and up to several kilobytes 
of email bodies. Thus, the data received for a new email is small. However, as we 
show in Section 3, existing email clients write received data of every email to the 
flash storage immediately, which is not energy efficient. Therefore, when an email 
client receives a new email, it should cache the received data in memory rather 
than writing them to flash immediately. Once the client has received a sufficient 
number of emails (e.g., 10 emails) or the cached data are larger than a threshold, 
it can flush all the data to flash storage together. Furthermore, the client may also 
piggyback data writes with other activities. For example, when the user turns on the 
smartphone to check emails or use other applications, the client can write its cached 
data to flash. As those flash writes share the same baseline power with other 
activities of the user, they will not introduce much extra energy or time overhead.
Delaying flash writes may cause data loss if the email client or the smartphone 
crashes before the cached data are written to flash storage. However, modem 
smartphone operating systems including Windows Phone, Android and iOS all run 
each application in a separate protection domain (i.e., the so called “application 
based security model”). Failures of one application will not affect other running ap­
plications. As a result, today’s smartphones are more reliable and crash less than 
before. Even when running out of battery, the operating system will terminate appli­
cations gracefully, to give them chance to save data onto flash. Smartphone email 
clients are also pretty reliable. We measured the default email client on Android 
by receiving 10,000 emails and did not observe any failure or crash. In addition, 
even if the email client crashes before writing the cached data to flash storage, it 
can re-sync the emails with the server. Therefore, in-memory data processing is
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able to reduce the energy cost of email receiving.
3.3.3 Reusing Existing Network Connections
In receiving emails, email clients should reuse existing network connections rather 
than making new ones. In particular, for the push email, because an email client 
already maintains a persistent network connection with a server to receive notifi­
cation of new incoming emails, it should receive a new email over the continuous 
network connection to save energy. Even for a poll email, when an email client 
does a second polling before the network connection of the last polling times out, 
it should also reuse the previous network connection.
While it may be easy and natural to make a new network connection to receive 
every new email, the energy cost may not be negligible. As most email services 
require a secure network connection, making a new network connection includes 
not only TCP layer handshakes but also SSL layer handshakes to negotiate the 
encryption method and exchange security keys. As shown in our experiments on 
Android in Section 3, the overhead of making a secure TCP connection is not neg­
ligible. Without transmitting any application data packets, it consumed 1,757 mJ 
energy to make a TCP/SSL connection. In total 6.9 KB data were transmitted be­
tween the client and server. WP is more energy efficient. It always reuses the same 
TCP connection to receive new emails.
3.3.4 Data Structure Partitioning
One interesting finding on WP is that the energy cost of receiving the same email 
increases significantly when the inbox size is large. On Android, the energy cost 
also increases with inbox size but the increase is not as significant as WP. The 
possible reason is that when storing a new email into the database of an inbox, 
it takes more time to update the metadata. For example, the email client needs
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Table 3.4: Energy and time cost of database writing
Energy cost per email (mJ) Time cost per email (ms)
DB in mem DB on flash DB in mem DB on flash
Individual writes 1 32 1 55
Batch writes 0.59 0.64 0.58 0.65
to search the whole inbox to associate the new email with the right conversation 
thread. The cost of doing so depends on the inbox size. In addition, when the inbox 
is too large to be loaded into the memory of the email client, searching the inbox 
takes more energy and time due to the frequent flash operations.
To solve this problem and reduce the energy cost of receiving an email, we pro­
pose partitioning a large inbox into two parts: one small inbox with recently received 
emails (e.g., emails received in last two weeks) and one large inbox containing all 
remaining emails. The email client only uses the small inbox to handling email re­
ceiving. That is, when receiving an email, the client only inserts it into the small 
inbox and updates the metadata without using the large inbox. Thus, the energy 
cost of receiving emails is reduced even if a smartphone stores many emails. This 
approach is based on a key observation: most of the time users only need to check 
recent emails on their smartphones. Therefore, it is not necessary to touch all the 
emails already stored in a smartphone in receiving new emails. When a user does 
need to access all the emails, e.g., in searching the whole inbox, the client can 
search both the small inbox and the large one to return the combined results. As 
searching a whole inbox happens much more rarely than receiving emails, inbox 
partitioning is able to save energy.
3.4 Implementation
Implementing the techniques proposed in Section 4 only requires modifications on 
the email client side. Since the Gmail application on Android and the built-in email
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client on WP are not open source, implementation is done on the built-in email 
client of Android, which is accessible and widely used. The source code we used 
is vanilla Android 4.0.4 with kernel 3.0.8.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the architecture of our implementation, focusing on email 
syncing and processing. On Android the built-in email client consists of two parts, 
each running in a separate process. The first part is the network communication 
part which implements the email protocol and handles all the communication details 
with the email server to receive and send emails. For Exchange email service, 
this part runs as an app named "Exchange". It runs in the background without 
a Ul. The other part is the data processing which processes received emails and 
provides user interfaces to handle all the interaction details with users including 
reading emails and composing emails to send out. It also deals with email storage, 
saving emails to and loading emails from the SQLite database. This part runs as 
an app named "Email". The Email app process and the Exchange app process 
exchange data through Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs).
To decouple data transmission from data processing, we revised the Email Pro­
tocol Handler in the Exchange application to do all data transmissions without wait­
ing for the Email Processor to finish processing a received email. Specifically, PING 
messages are sent via the PING Engine in Figure 3.7. In the original client, the 
PING Engine checks up in a two-second interval whether the Email Protocol Han­
dler allows it to resume PING messaging after an email-receiving event ends. So 
there is a delay between the completion of receiving an email and the start of PING. 
The energy is wasted because the cellular module has to delay its sleep mode. We 
improved the signaling between the Email Protocol Hander and the PING Engine 
so that a PING message can be sent out immediately. Thus, all data transmissions 
are batched together to save energy. We also revised the Email Processor to re­
port an error if anything is wrong in processing an email so that the Email Protocol
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Handler can re-sync with the email server. In addition, we revised the Email Proto­
col Handler to receive emails by re-using the existing TCP connection rather than 
making a new one, avoiding energy waste of TCP/SSL handshakes.
In the Email application, we added a new Database Manager, loading a small 
cache inbox into the memory to implement in-memory email receiving. On the 
flash storage, all the emails are stored in a big database. The Database Manager 
manages the data sync between the in-memory cache inbox and the persistent one 
on the flash storage. When the user interacts with the smartphone or we receive 
more than a customized number of emails, the Database Manager commits the 
new email data onto the flash storage.
Android does not provide an API for fast dormancy and we cannot control the 
3G tail time on the fly. We have managed to enable fast dormancy on the Nexus S 
smartphone by flashing a new baseband firmware.
3.5 Evaluation
We evaluate our implementation by measuring the total energy saved in receiving 
an email and the individual ones contributed by each technique we proposed and 
implemented. For all the experiments, we used Exchange push email service with 
the original built-in email client provided by Android and our revised one on a Nexus 
S smartphone. For each experiment, we repeated for the procedure five times and 
report the average results with standard deviations.
Total energy saving. Figure 3.8 shows the total energy saving of our revised 
email client, compared to the original one when the inbox size is 200 emails but 
the new incoming email has different sizes. On average the total energy saving is 
44.3%, with a narrow range from 41.2% to 46.9%. These results demonstrate that 
our proposed techniques are able to significantly reduce the energy cost of email
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receiving. The energy savings mainly come from the shortened email receiving 
time. On average our revised email client reduces the time period of receiving the 
emails by 47.6%, compared to the original one.
Figure 3.9 shows the total energy savings of our revised email client in receiving 
a small email of 10 KB with different inbox sizes. Similar to Figure 8, we can see that 
our revised email client is able to effectively reduce the total energy cost of email 
receiving no matter how many emails the inbox has. The average energy saving is 
45.8%, also with a small range from 39.9% to 51.3%. Compared to Figure 8, the 
average energy saving is higher because when the email is large, the received data 
volume becomes large and more energy will be saved by our proposed techniques, 
as shown later in this Section.
Energy saving of each technique. Figure 3.10 shows the anatomy of the total 
energy saving in receiving the 10 KB email with an inbox of 200 emails. For the total 
energy savings of 7,690 mJ, the largest part comes from reducing 3G tail time which 
saves 2,448 mJ (32%) energy. Decoupling data transmission from data processing 
part and reusing TCP connections also save a significant energy cost, each with 
1,757 mJ (23%). The in-memory processing part and using small cache inbox 
part reduce relatively less energy, saving 806 mJ (10%) and 922 mJ (12%)energy, 
respectively.
Reducing the 3G tail time and reusing the TCP connections have fixed energy 
savings, independent from incoming email size and inbox size. However, the en­
ergy saving of other techniques may depend on the email size or inbox size. Figure 
11 shows how much energy can be saved by decoupling data transmission from 
data processing for different email sizes. We can see that generally the energy 
saving increases when the email size becomes large. The decoupling technique 
tries to batch all data transmissions together. When the email is large, more data 
is transmitted over the network and thus the energy saved by batching becomes
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large.
Similarly, Figure 3.12 shows how much energy can be saved by in-memory 
processing for different email sizes. We can see that the energy saving is high for 
large emails. This is because the processing cost (e.g., writing operation) heavily 
depends on email size. Thus, when the email size is large, processing the email 
entirely with memory operations will save more energy.
Figure 3.13 shows the benefit of using a small cache inbox for email receiving 
when the total inbox size is different. The size of the small cache inbox we used 
is 20. Thus, the benefit for the inbox size of 20 in Figure 3.13 is zero. For a larger 
inbox size, we can see that the extra energy saving caused by using the small 
cache inbox increase as the total inbox size becomes large. For the total inbox size 
of 10,000 emails, the extra energy saving is 2,750 mJ. These results demonstrate 
the effectiveness of using the small cache inbox.
Note that in all the above experiments, we measured the energy cost of receiv­
ing individual emails without counting the energy saving of batch writing multiple 
emails onto flash. In our implementation we batch 20 emails together for writing 
their data onto flash. By doing so, we can further save 634 mJ energy per email. 
On average this increases the total energy saving of receiving a 10 KB email to 
49.9% in different inbox sizes.
Furthermore, we also calculate how much extra energy can be saved if we can 
put 3G interface into sleep immediately after the end of receiving an email. Doing 
so we can further save 2,448 mJ of energy. For receiving a 10 KB email with an 
inbox size of 200, this will increase the total energy saving by 77.9%.
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3.6 Event Receiving in Other Applications
Despite this chapter focusing only on email receiving, the techniques we proposed 
may also be applied to other applications. Example applications include various 
social network applications such as Facebook and Twitter, locations based appli­
cations which receive notifications upon location changes, and many other appli­
cations which receive push notifications when new updates or new in-application 
content are available. Similar to email, when in standby mode, those applications 
maintain their own persistent connection or use a separate push notification service 
like Google client notification service [16] to keep connected to a server for receiv­
ing various events or poll changes from a server. Such event receiving is very 
similar to email receiving and follows the “transmission-processing-transmission” 
pattern. Each event receiving also wakes up the 3G interface and a smartphone’s 
entire operating system for a small amount of data transmission and processing. 
Due to the similarity between receiving emails and receiving other events, those 
applications may also have the issues with energy inefficiency we found in email 
receiving, such as sparse data transmissions resetting 3G tail timer, frequent small 
flash writes, and making new network connections unnecessarily. Therefore, our 
proposed techniques can be used as general design guidelines for those applica­
tions rather than specific techniques designed for email receiving only.
We plan to investigate more applications to further study how the techniques we 
proposed in this chapter may be used to reduce the energy cost of receiving events 
in connected standby. In addition, recent tablet devices and other types of mobile 
devices have started to function like smartphones, keeping connected in standby 
mode to receive various network events including emails. For example, Windows 
8 introduces a new connected standby power mode [82] to provide such support. 
We also plan to study the power performance of applications on those devices and
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look for potential improvements.
3.7 Related Work
System power management. Power management is important to mobile devices 
including smartphones due to the limited power supply of batteries. All smartphone 
operating systems come with components to leverage hardware capabilities and 
manage system activities to save power, e.g., adjusting screen backlight levels, 
running CPU at low frequency, putting network interfaces into sleep or killing power- 
hungry applications in low battery mode. Various techniques have been proposed 
to reduce the power consumption of each key component of a smartphone such as 
the screen [64], CPU [74] and network communication [33,42]. However, even with 
good system-level and component-level power management, applications that are 
not well designed can still cause high energy consumption.
Finding energy bugs of applications. Recently researchers have started to 
study how to improve the power performance of mobile applications by finding en­
ergy bugs. Energy bugs are not real program bugs causing failures but they lead 
to unnecessarily high energy consumption. For example, in [70] the authors pro­
posed techniques for automatically finding non-sleep energy bugs in applications. 
However, such a tool depends on pre-configured program patterns to find energy 
problems, e.g., requiring a Wakelock to prevent the system from sleeping with­
out releasing it, and only works for serious non-sleep bugs. Authors in [64] built 
tools for developers to estimate the energy consumption of their applications and 
find potential energy inefficiency issues. Our work focuses on finding energy in­
efficiency when receiving email by measuring the energy performance of existing 
email clients. The techniques we proposed are complimentary with existing work 
and can be used as general design guidelines for other applications.
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Fast dormancy. The problem of the cellular data network tail has drawn a lot of 
attention. Smartphone manufacturers have developed their own and inconsistent 
ways to reduce the energy cost of a cellular tail, which results in the standard ap­
proach called network-controlled fast dormancy in 3GPP [13,72], Researcher also 
proposed schemes to reduce the power consumption of applications by using fast 
dormancy adaptively [18,72]. We believe that fast dormancy should be used in con­
nected standby. However, even with fast dormancy, there is still wasted energy in 
the event receiving during the connected standby due to very sparse network activ­
ities. We propose that the OS should provide a global service to collect the network 
usage information of all the applications running in the connected standby. When 
all the applications finish their event receiving, the service works with the cellular 
network to immediately put the 3G interface into sleep mode and thus minimizes 
the energy waste of the 3G tail time in connected standby.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the power performance of email sync on the Win­
dows Phone and Android operating systems. We conducted experiments to mea­
sure the energy cost of email receiving in existing email clients, using both push 
and poll emails, with different email services, email sizes and inbox sizes. Together 
with our analysis of the network and flash storage activities, the measured results 
indicate that existing email clients are not energy-efficient in several aspects. Be­
sides 3G tail time, the main source of inefficiency stems from the coupling of the 
data transmis-sion and data processing, which is a bad design choice in connected 
standby mode. Frequent storage access, making new TCP connections to receive 
new emails and updating a large inbox are further components that increase the 
time duration of email sync and lead to energy waste.
77
Based on the experiment, we advocate that the fast dorman-cy should be used 
in the connected standby and propose other techniques to address the energy in­
efficiency of ex-isting email clients, including the decoupling of data trans-mission 
from data processing, in-memory processing, reus-ing existing network connec­
tions and using a small cache inbox to handle the email sync. We have imple­
mented these techniques and evaluation results show that average energy sav­
ings reach 49.9%. If we can put the 3G interface into sleep mode immediately after 
receiving an email, the total energy savings can be increased to 77.9%.
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4 Access Point Association in Wire 
less LAN
It is already very common for Wireless LAN clients like mobile phones and laptops 
to face multiple choices of APs because of the high density deployment. Which AP 
to attach is not a trivial question especially when there are a lot of nearby users who 
may inference with each other. A user selecting an inappropriate AP will experience 
bad service, or even hurt other users' throughput. The current technique of AP 
selection is for the user to selfishly pick the AP with the strongest signal, or RSSI 
value. The intuition is that factors like multipath effect and path loss which reduce 
throughput's will have a smaller effect when the user is communicating with an AP 
with a larger RSSI.
This simple strategy might fail when there is a large number of users crowded 
together. Consider the case when we have two APs on orthogonal channels, one 
with much stronger signal strength than the other, and a collection of users. All 
the users will simply pick the same AP (with the largest RSSI), so that the actual 
throughput of each user is very small because of channel contention between users. 
Based on this observation, alternative criteria such as selecting the AP which yields 
the largest throughput have been suggested.
However, it is unclear how well this selfish strategy will perform when every 
user attempts to connect to the AP which is able to maximize their own throughput.
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Unlike an AP's RSSI value measured by a user which is not affected by additional 
users associating with that AP, the AP's throughput will change as more users join 
in. Therefore, a user selecting an AP based on throughput may have to switch APs 
constantly, hence lowering overall performance.
In practice, we believe a good performance is to achieve the maximized mini­
mal throughput for all clients. Using this simple but reasonable metric, we seek to 
design a practical distributed protocol for AP association. We theoretically analyze 
the worst-case performance of the selfish strategy, and introduce an online algo­
rithm that achieves a better worst-case performance. Incoming user employing this 
algorithm determines an irrevocable association, only making use of the load infor­
mation on the nearby APs, in order to minimize the L p  norm of the loads on all APs 
at the moment. Based on our online algorithm, we have implemented an associa­
tion protocol, SmartAssoc, for commodity hardware driver at the client side. This 
protocol works well with current legacy 802.11 APs. Using a combination of real 
experiments and extensive simulation, we demonstrate that our online association 
protocol performs better than the RSSI-based and selfish AP selection.
The rest of this chapter is as follows. We give an overview of the related work 
in Section 4.1, and explain our motivation in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 examines the 
selfish strategy in distributed wireless AP selection scenario in a quantitative way. 
Section 4.4 proposes our online algorithm as the association strategy for the pro­
tocol design of SmartAssoc, and characterize its performance properties through 
theoretical analysis in a realistic model. We present the practical and efficient im­
plementation of proposed association protocol on the off-the-shelf wireless LAN 
adapter in Section 4.5. SmartAssoc is demonstrated through real experiments in 
Section 4.6, and simulation results are provided in Section 4.7. Finally, Section 4.8 
concludes.
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4.1 Related Work
AP association plays an important role in improving wireless performance [43,48, 
55,60,62,67,75,79,84,90]. The signal-noise ratios, which is popularly used for 
access point selection in 802.11, has demonstrated as a bad idea by G. Judd et 
al. [44]. In their paper, some other criteria like AP load information are taken into 
consideration for improving the network performance and achieving load balanc­
ing. Metrics evaluating the AP load are interested by both academic community 
and industry. [86 ] relies on passive measurement of delay intervals between the 
time when a beacon is scheduled for transmission and its eventual transmission to 
estimate an AP's load. In [68 ], a combined metric is applied, which includes the 
number of stations associated, mean RSSI for the station set of AP and regular 
RSSI. Similar AP-assisted approach is proposed in [29], to give associated clients 
the information about load through beacons.
Some solutions concerning this association issue are proposed in other direc­
tions. [26] creates multiple virtual interfaces based on one single wireless card, 
and make them communicate with associated APs like simultaneously. However, 
it needs an efficient association mechanism to define which AP and how long to 
connect, as well as a low handoff overhead. [46] aggregates the bandwidth avail­
able at accessible APs and also balances their loads by introducing a fast switching 
and a scheduler to distribute client's time across APs so as to maximize through­
put. Both of them differs from techniques above in that they do not pick a single 
AP, but rather multiplexes the various APs in a manner that maximizes throughput. 
In paper [21]and [65], however, they believe association decisions must rely on a 
global view of the entire WLAN, rather than the local viewpoint of an individual client 
or AP. [65] introduces a central controller to aggregate information received from 
all APs and also control them based on this information. In paper [21], more com­
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plicated central scheme for AP association is theoretically discussed. It claims to 
achieve both balanced load and max-min fairness by providing central algorithmic 
solution according to a formulation indicating strong correlation between AP loads 
and clients' bandwidth allocations. And it concerns multiple association model, 
which is not mentioned in [65]. Actually it is hard to change a wireless network 
architecture already deployed, and not practical as all users are operating in the 
decentralized manner.
The selfish behavior of users in a congestion game has been studied theoret­
ically. A special case where each user's decision is a singleton set is considered 
in [85], while [61] describes a class of congestion game where the payoff function 
associated with each resource is user specific. The convergences under different 
load balancing scenarios are provided in [36], In this work we model the decentral­
ized AP selection with selfish users as an extension of the weighted singleton con­
gestion game in which the weight of a user varies as the associated AP changes. 
Other modelings of the wireless infrastructure selection include [63] and [25], tar­
geting at different scenarios and goals. The major distinction of our work is that we 
design and implement on the commercial chipset an online greedy AP selection 
protocol in the distributed manner. The performance is supported by theoretical 
proof and demonstrated both in real experiments and simulations.
Compared with decentralized methods, work by [21] and [65] uses the idea that 
better AP association decisions can be obtained by relying on a global view of the 
entire WLAN, or an extra centralized controller. AP side system is modified in [65] 
to aggregate workload information and provide association control according to it. 
In [21], a more complicated central scheme for AP association is discussed.
There are also other papers discussing how to multiplex multiple APs. In [26], 
it created multiple virtual interfaces based on one single wireless card, and made 
them communicate with associated APs like simultaneously. The paper [46] built a
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multi-interface association mechanism to distribute a client's data traffic on multiple 
accessible APs in a scenario where the backhaul link is the bandwidth bottleneck.
We take a practical wireless model that well capture the complicated interfer­
ence among APs and clients. Considering interference like [89] makes great impact 
on the real world performance of algorithms designed upon this model. From the 
technical perspective, the load balancing literature provides the foundation of our 
solution to the formulated problem of AP association. We borrow results from the 
literature [19,53,80] to better understand the hardness of our formulated problem. 
We elaborate each work later when it is used. Load balancing also finds applica­
tions in other fields, such as wireless sensor networks [56].
4.2 Motivation
We consider an IEEE 802.11 infrastructure network [59], in which there are m  APs 
and n  stationary clients or users. Given no central controller and local information, 
All the clients are allowed to freely choose an AP within the transmission range 
to associate with. The goal of this project is to maximize the minimum throughput 
over all clients. Through this chapter, we consider the MAC layer throughput if no 
specification.
The AP association protocol currently employed in IEEE 802.11 networks lets a 
client associate with the AP that gives the strongest signal. We term this the Best- 
RSSI strategy. However, the Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) may not 
be a good indicator of throughput changes. [91] provides an experimental example 
to demonstrate this poor correlation between RSSI and throughput.
It is easy to observe that the relatively stable state of the RSSI does not reflect 
the relatively intensive fluctuation of the sampled throughput. Thus, RSSI is not 
suitable and accurate enough to evaluate an AP's performance. It is possible to
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end up with a situation in which all clients connect to a single AP. In this case, the 
competitive ratio1, in terms of average client throughput, can be as bad as l/m . 
When m  is large, this plummeting performance becomes unacceptable.
4.3 Selfish User Strategy
One natural alternative to solving the above problem, with respect to our goal, is to 
let the clients behave myopically by applying in decentralized AP selection the best- 
reply policy. Explicitly, it means that every user keeps moving to associate with the 
AP that could offer it the best throughput until no user can gain higher throughput 
by unilaterally deviating from its current decision (Nash Equilibrium).
To simplify the analysis for selfish users, we make two assumptions in this sec­
tion. In the next section, we will use a more realistic assumptions. First, we assume 
that the interference between the communications of two APs is not considered, 
i.e., the nearby APs operate on orthogonal channels. Second, the association pro­
cedure of a user is considered as an atomic operation, so only one user perform 
association at a time. The time at which a user makes a decision to change APs 
is marked as a decision step. However, we do not require users to follow a cer­
tain decision order, which means in each decision step the user who is picking a 
new AP could be any one. Under these assumptions, we will show that such selfish 
user game converges to a Nash Equilibrium often having non-optimal performance. 
More complicated scenarios even cannot grantee the existence of the Equilibrium 
state [36,61].
We denote by Ua the set of users connecting with AP a. So let na =  \Ua\ repre­
sent the cardinality of this set. We designate by stu the percentage of service time
1 competitive ratio is the performance ratio, with respect to some metric, between worst outcome 
of certain association protocol and the optimal strategy case. Here we mean the competitive ratio in 
terms of throughput. Later, after we transform the problem, we mean the competitive ratio in terms 
of load.
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the user u gains from associated AP, and Tu corresponds to the throughput of u. 
And for any user u and AP a, we use Rua to denote the transmission rate under the 
situation only u is associating with a. varies even for the same user. For the rest 
of this section, unless otherwise specified, the transmission rate refers to the effec­
tive transmission rate, which considers the overhead caused by retransmissions, 
random backoff and so on.
To examine the performance of this protocol, we consider two aspects: conver­
gence and competitive ratio. The competitive ratio here is equivalent to the price of 
anarchy2(PoA) using minimum user throughput as social cost. The following sub­
sections show first whether the selfish user protocol will eventually stabilize and 
how fast the protocol will achieve convergence in general, and after that give the 
competitive ratio of the protocol.
4.3.1 Convergence of the Selfish Strategy
In this subsection, we will show how to mode! this selfish throughput strategy as a 
special case of the weighted congestion game, where the weight of a user varies 
as the associated AP set, which is singleton, changes. This game is proved to be 
converged with not ideal speed by leveraging the technique similar to [36]. We start 
with a lemma to characterize the throughput calculation.
Lemma 1. All the users on an AP a have the same throughput Ta
Ta =  1 (4.1)
2-^ ieUa Ria
Proof. Owing to Carrier-Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) 
protocol, all the users associated to the same AP, no matter what their transmission 
rates are, have a fair chance to seize the channel for packet transmission.
2the ratio of the worst-case social cost among all Nash Equilibria over the optimal cost
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Therefore, given the same packet size 2 , any user u connecting to AP a with a 
transmission rate Rua is assigned a portion of service time from a:
stu =  ^  (4 -2)
iZ ia  & ia
It is obvious that every user on the same AP has throughput:
Ta =  Tu =  stu x  Rua=  — — j ~  (4.3)
2->ieUa Ria
□
Given the Lemma 1 and assumptions we made, the selfish AP selection can be 
modeled as an extension of the congestion game. For sake of clarity and consis­
tence in terminology, we describe this model in the wireless LAN scenario. Con­
sider a set M  of APs, each having a load function depending on the total weight of 
the users associated (Definition 1), and a set U  of users, each of whom only can 
choose one AP from a permissible subset of M  (in the absence of a coordinating 
authority). The weight of a user i on AP j  (i.e. the load imposed by the user) is de­
fined as the reciprocal of the transmission rate, Accordingly, maximizing
the minimum throughput over all clients is equivalent to minimizing the maximum 
load over all APs.
Definition 1. The load of an AP a, L a> is
La =  E  L -  =  E  7T
ieua i€U a
For the convergence proof, we introduce a sorted vector (in ascending order) 
of all users' throughput as the potential function. According to Lemma  1, we can 
simplify this vector to a new one 7* by using Ta above to represent respectively the 
current throughput of every user associated with AP a (for V a 6  M ,  where M  is the
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set of all APs). Put differently, given a user i  associated with AP a, its throughput 
is replaced with Ta in the 7*.
The following defines the lexicographic order on different vectors (7*).
Definition 2. One vector 7* defined above is called lexicographically larger than 
the other one 'f ' if^f's first unequal element is larger than its corresponding position 
index one in 7 *', where both vectors are in ascending order.
Definition 3. In 7*, Ta(s) denotes the throughput Ta at the decision step s.
We show the convergence of the protocol by identifying a potential function and 
showing that this potential strictly increases after each step. Consider the vector 
7*, in an ascending order of all users’ throughput.
Theorem 1. 7* lexicographically increases when a useri moves from AP j  to k for 
better throughput.
Proof. Based on the assumption that interference is not considered in this sec­
tion, we know this migration only influences two components of 7*: one corre­
sponding to the throughput for AP j  that user i  just left, while the other corresponds 
to the AP k that i has joined. Other components remain unchanged. Suppose 
this is the s +  l-th decision step. Because user i  moves for a higher throughput, 
Tk(s +  1) >  7}(s); and because AP j  has one less client, its throughput increases: 
Tj(s  +  1) >  Tj(s) .  In a word, if 7)(s) is theptft component in 7* at step s, T j (s  + 1) 
and Tk(s + 1) reside at two positions whose indexes are no smaller than pth (at the 
right side of pth position including p).
Assume in 7* at step s, (m -  q)th (recall m  is the number of APs) is the first 
position in which the value is larger than the one in position p, i.e., there are q 
throughput larger than T)(s) in 7*. Note that only if no throughput is equal to T)(s) 
in 7* at step s, m  -  q =  p. After step s +  1, this number q increases by 1 for the 
reason mentioned above (7} moves to the right). Thus, the (m  -  q -  l ) th position
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becomes the first position that holds different values for step s and step s + 1  in 7*. 
Obviously, according to the definition of lexicographical order, the vector 7* at step 
s +  1 is larger. □
Above theorem is also applicable to the extended scenario that there are new 
users coming into the network.
Since we have shown that users' migration always increases the potential - 7*. 
this gives us an upper bound (Theorem 2) on the convergence time in general.
Theorem 2. Without specifying the concrete underlying configuration, this network 
(m APs and n clients) reaches the equilibrium in at most m n steps.
Proof. It is equal to the number of different sorted vectors, which is bounded by 
the number of network topology snapshots. In other words, after performing at most 
mn steps, this potential function 7* will come to a state at which it will not be larger 
any more. This means that no matter which user has the chance to make a decision 
at the next step, it will stay on its current AP from its selfish point of view. □
We have shown that the network will finally converge to an equilibrium within 
bounded steps. However, the number of steps may be exponentially growing with 
respect to the network size, which is presented in the following theorem. Whenever 
an AP accepts a new user (maybe users from other APs), we count it as a new AP 
association.
Theorem 3. For a network with m  identical APs and m 2 users, there exists a sce­
nario where the number of AP associations is at least 2m.
Proof. Our construction is inspired by, but quite different from, the identical ma­
chine scheduling in [37].
The network is as follows. The users are divided into m  groups G u G2, . . . ,  Gm, 
each of which has m  users. Users in the same group have the same weight.
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We set the weight of each group recursively. For G x, its weight is 1. For Gu its 
weight is set as more than the sum of the weights of previous groups' users, say 
WGi — wGj +  1. Such weight setting can guarantee that two APs have the
same load if and only if they serve the same number of users from each group. 
In the equilibrium after all users join the network, each AP serves m  users, each 
of which comes from a different group. Since each user's choice is deterministic, 
i.e., it chooses the lightest load AP (note here APs are identical), the number of 
AP associations is determined by the order in which users join the network and the 
order in which they make adjustments. In the following, we construct an adversary 
that controls such orders to cause more than 2m AP associations. Whenever the 
adversary releases a user, the user can join the network, or adjust APs, based on 
the best-reply policy.
Let F(m)  be the resulting number of AP associations for an m-AP network under 
the adversary's strategy S(m)  described as follows. We will prove F(m )  > 2m by 
induction.
For m  =  2 , the adversary's strategy S (2) is to release users in an arbitrary order 
(e.g., light weight first). It holds trivially that F (2) > 22 since there are 4 users and 
each of them invokes at least one AP association.
Suppose F(k )  >  2k and this is resulted from the adversary's strategy S(k).  Con­
sider the case when m  =  k + 1. Now each group has k + 1 users. The adversary will 
use the following strategy S(k  +  1). First, it applies the following strategy, creating 
a k-AP network sub-problem.
• Release one user from Gk+i.
• Select k users from each G{ where i  =  1, 2 , . . . ,  k, making k2 users. Apply 
S(k ) to them.
The user from Gk+1 will occupy an AP. Denote this AP by A P a. The later released k2
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users will only consider the other k APs, because even the sum of their weights is 
less than APa's current load. Therefore, these k2 users, together with the k available 
APs, create a k-AP instance, and the number of involved AP associations is F(k).
In the next, the adversary releases several users, whose associations we ignore 
but will lead to an interesting equilibrium.
• Release the rest users from Gu G2, ■■■,Gk (i.e., one user per group).
• Release k -  1 users from Gk+i- Wait until equilibrium.
Consider the equilibrium. There must be k APs, each of which serves exactly one 
user from Gk+i and does not serve other users. All the k(k + 1) users from the first 
k groups are crowded in one AP (denote it by APb).
At last, the adversary creates another k-AP sub-problem.
• Release the last user. It is from Gk+1 , and it will choose APb.
• For users at APb, select k users from each Gi where * =  1,2 , . . . , k ,  making 
k2 users. Apply S(k) to them.
The released user from Gk+1 will choose APb due to lightest load. After it asso­
ciates with APb, all the other users at APb have the incentive to move to the other 
k APs. None of the selected k2 users will associate back with APb at any time until 
the equilibrium, because APb has at least k +  1 users (one user per group) so that 
there must be some AP that is less loaded. (Consider i from i =  fc +  1 to i =  1. If 
there exists an AP serving two users from Git then there is at least one AP serving 
no user from Gi. This AP is less loaded than APb.) The k2 users and the other k 
APs create a k-AP instance, contributing to F(k)  AP associations.
We can see that, under strategy S(k +  1), the resulting F(k  +  1) is composed 
of at least two F(k), so we have F(k +  1) >  2F(k) >  2k+l. The theorem follows 
immediately. □
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Note that this theorem considers identical APs, a special case of our model that 
assumes unrelated APs. The implications of the theorem are two folds. First, it is 
impossible to bound the convergence time by polynomials of m  and n. Second, 
some user may need to change AP for exponentially many times (2m/m 2), which 
significantly degrades performance.
4.3.2 Competitive Ratio
In the following, we obtain the competitive ratio with respect to the minimal through­
put over all clients in the selfish protocol. We still assume that the number of APs 
is m  and the number of clients (or users) is n. We also assume that, among all 
users, the maximal available transmission rate is Rmax and the minimal available 
transmission rate is Rmin. Recall that we define the load a client imposes to an 
AP as the reciprocal of the transmission rate of a client when connecting to an AP. 
Therefore, we define TLmax =  p-3—, and L min =  -^L~.
*+ m in  * *m a x
in a Nash Equilibrium of the selfish strategy, suppose the most loaded AP is k, 
which has a load L s, i.e., L k. Since this selfish user game reaches the equilibrium, 
any client connecting to AP k is not willing to move to any other AP j .  That is,
L 5 <  Lmaa:+ L j forV? e {a|a € M&a ^  k}. Thus, L s-m < ’L rnax-(m — l)+ Y l1jL i^ ‘j ^
L m a x  ' 1 )  IL 'm ax  ‘ r i
^  L m a i ‘ ip "t" m  1 )
— m
Then in the optimal strategy, the maximal load over all the APs is L °  >  In 
sum, the price of anarchy is
L ^ Tl -|- Tfl 1 
L °  Ti JLmjn
This bounds the PoA from above. In the following, we bound the worst-case
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PoA from below.
Theorem 4. There exists a scenario where the competitive ratio is no smaller than 
(m -  l ) / ( l  +  e) where m is the number of APs and e is a small positive constant.
Proof. The example below first appears in [17], and recently in [52] for slightly 
different purposes (centralized greedy load balancing and sequential load balanc­
ing game). We show that this example also works in our context (distributed selfish 
user association).
Suppose there are m  APs and m  - 1 users. Each user i  e U can only associate 
with two APs, i and i +  1. The weights are set as follows. For i  e U, L i>i+l =  i  and 
Liti =  1 +  e. For this example, the maximum load of the optimal solution is 1 +  e.
The adversary can release users sequentially as 1, 2, . . . , m — 1. It is easy to 
see that user i  will associate with AP i  + 1  in the equilibrium, causing the maximum 
load to be m  -  1. Therefore, its competitive ratio is (m -  l ) / ( l  +  e). □
The theorem shows that the price of anarchy is In the following section, 
we use an online algorithm with competitive ratio 0 (log m), which is an exponential 
improvement.
In summary, the selfish user protocol has a high convergence time and a poor 
performance in some network scenarios.
4.4 Online Algorithm
We have shown that both the Best-RSSI and selfish user protocols perform poorly 
under certain scenarios. In this section, we introduce our practical online associa­
tion strategy. Our online algorithm considers merely communication load including 
interference and congestion, which provides a more realistic model.
The protocol is simple without assuming a complex interaction among clients 
and APs. We merely assume that, when a new client joins the network, it can
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measure the loads (recall the Definition 1) of all APs within its hearing range. If 
the client does not affect an AP, or does so with negligible influence, it does not 
need to know the load on that AP. For example, if a client is far away from an AP, 
the interaction between them or the influence would be marginal and the client will 
not consider the information on that AP when it makes its AP association decision. 
We will show by implementation in section 4.5 that this assumption can be approx­
imately achieved through a practical and low-overhead measurement method. We 
do not even assume how the loads will be changed when a client joins -  although 
we do assume the load on each AP will be non-decreasing when a client joins.
In the following, we examine several scenarios to show the ramifications of our 
assumptions and demonstrate how much our assumptions conform to the reality.
• Interference with APs: When client i joins the network, it might interfere with 
the transmission and reception on several APs. We denote the loads imposed 
on AP j  after i makes its association decision as L y . Note that j  may not be 
the AP that client i associates with.
• Interference with clients: When client i joins the network, it might interfere 
with another client k. Even though i may not directly interfere with the AP 
(say AP j )  that k is associated with (possibly due to being out of transmission 
range), the interference of i on k's communication may change the load on 
AP j .  If the load on AP j  is visible to client i, this scenario is amenable to our 
analysis; otherwise, we will ignore the load imposed by this indirect influence 
because the load change due to this rippling effect is marginal.
• Myopic network configuration: When a client i joins the network, it may not 
see all the APs because of the limited communication range. If the client does 
not see an AP, we assume the load change on that AP owing to the joining 
of client i is negligible. Furthermore, in this case, client i will not be able to
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associate with that AP because there is no usable bidirectional link between 
the client and the AP.
In summary, we study a more practical and complicated wireless LAN model 
here than the one used in the previous section. The weight (communication load) 
a user adds on the associated AP might vary as the local network configuration 
changes or new incoming clients appear.
We now formally define the problem. Due to interference, a user may increase 
load to other APs, in addition to the AP that it associates with. To capture such 
interference effects, we denote by 5hjtk the increased load to AP j  if user i chooses 
AP k. The generalized AP association problem (GAS) can be formulated as an 
integer linear programming problem.
min max x^ i,j,k
i , k
subject to
(GAS)
^  % i ,k  =  1 )  V i  ^  U
k
x i>k e { o , l } ,  V i e U , k e M
where x e {0 , is the association matrix with elements xiik. The two con­
straints force each user to associate with exactly one AP.
This model generalizes the previous model in Section 4.3. If each user can only 
increase its associated AP's load, i.e.,
{Lj i if j  =  k’
0 otherwise
then it becomes the previous problem.
In the new problem, for a specific user i and an AP j ,  even if i is not associated99
AP 1 AP 2 
AP 1 3,3 4,2
AP 2 4,2 3,3
Table 4.1: The cost matrix for two users under different AP associations (left for user 1, and 
top for user 2). Each entry (a, b) is the cost for users 1 and 2 respectively.
with j ,  the exact load induced to j  is dependent on which AP user % associates 
with. Specifically, 6i>jtk may be different from 5iyj<l for k ^ l .  We do not assume any 
relationship between different only assuming that they are non-negative (a 
new association won’t decrease any AP's load). To see the difficulty of this problem, 
we should note that the input information can no longer be modeled by a bipartite 
graph.
The selfish strategy in the previous section has worse performance under this 
general model. There may not exist an equilibrium. To see this, we encode the 
classic game, matching pennies, in the model. Consider the 2-user and 2-AP sce­
nario. Let <51,1,1 =  61,2,2 =  #2,1,2 =  #2,2,1 =  2 and all others are set as 1. The resulting 
cost matrix is in Table 4.1. We can see that user 1 prefers to have the same choice 
as user 2 does, while user 2 prefers to differ. In distributed scenarios, they will keep 
switching APs forever.
In fact, the problem is a generalized version of unrelated machine load balancing 
problem. Therefore, all the hardness results of the latter problem trivially hold for the 
new problem. Specifically, no polynomial algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio 
less than 3/2 unless P =  N P  [53]. No online algorithm can achieve a competitive 
ratio less than [log(m +  1)] [19].3 For the load balancing problem, all the constant 
approximation algorithms are based on linear relaxations. There are two kinds of 
rounding techniques [53,80]. Among them, [80] is not applicable to our problem. It 
requires to sort the users by their loads to the same AP, while in our case, one user
3Their work considers a special case of unrelated machines. The machines have identical speed 
but each user can only select a subset of the machines. This case can be easily encoded by our 
model.
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may contribute different loads to the same AP. The algorithm in [53] is applicable 
to our problem, but it is Q(m)-competitive, not a constant approximation algorithm, 
as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. To solve problem GAS, algorithm [53] is (m +  l)-competitive where m 
is the number of APs. The bound is almost tight in that there exist a class of GAS 
instances that the algorithm gives m-competitive solutions.
Proof. We first show how the algorithm works, then prove its competitive ratio, 
and then construct the set of bad input instances. The competitive ratio is proved 
by following the same procedure as in [53], where they proved the 2-approximation 
ratio for the traditional load balancing problem.
The algorithm performs binary search for the optimum load. In each iteration, it 
checks whether the optimal solution could yield maximum load T.  To answer this 
question, it drops the integral restrictions and checks the feasibility of the following 
linear program.
^  x i,k$i,j,k V? € M
i , k
=  Vi € U
* k
%i,k > 0 ,  Vi £ U,k E  M
kxitk =  0 if 3j € M , S i i j i k> T
It is easy to see that, if the optimal solution yields maximum load T, then the lin­
ear program above is feasible. Suppose the linear program is feasible. We can 
find an extreme solution x (a vertex of the polytope defined by the constraints). 
The algorithm then rounds fractional solution to integral assignment by finding a 
maximum matching for the fractionally assigned users (users correspond to frac­
tional variables in x). We relax the maximum matching requirement to an arbitrary
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semi-matching if no maximum matching exists.
We now prove the competitive ratio. We will prove that the rounding of the 
fractional extreme solution x produces an integer solution x such that
Xi,k$i,j,k < T  +  m T , V j €  M
i,k
* =  l, Vi e U
k
k € {0,1} Vi <E U, k G Af
The extreme solution x contains at most m + n  non-zero variables, among which 
the non-integer variables correspond to at most m users. To see this, note that by 
definition an extreme solution must have ran2 (the total number of variables) linearly 
independent constraints satisfied with equality. Among the constraints appeared in 
the linear program, at most m +  n o f  them could yield non-zero solution (the m  
constraints for APs and the n  constraints for users). Therefore, there are at most 
m  +  n  non-zero variables in x. Since each user who corresponds to non-integer 
variables could contribute at least 2 non-zero variables, there are at most m  such 
users by a counting argument.
Now we assign users with integer variables in x to the corresponding APs. After 
this assignment, the load at any AP is at most T . Then we assign users with non­
integer variables. Recall that we assign fractionally assigned user to any machine 
that they have positive fractional assignment to, thus each fractionally assigned 
user contributes at most T  load to each AP. Otherwise, we should have xi<k =  0 due 
to the existence of j  such that Sitjtk >  T. Given that there are at most m  fractionally 
assigned users, the additional load to each AP can not exceed m T . Thus the claim 
is proved.
In the following, we construct the class of bad instances. On these instances, 
the algorithm gives m-cornpetitive ratio (even with maximum matching strategy).
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Consider the network with the same number of users and APs, i.e., n =  m. We set
m—1
OO
\i k — i  
if k =  i  +  1 
otherwise
where sid are to be defined later and i  +  1 is defined to be 1 for i  =  m. In other 
words, we set each user i  to be able to associate with two APs, APs i  and i  +  1. 
For sitj , we set
1 \f i  +  j  <  m  +  1 
0 otherwise
Now we have finished constructing the set of instances. We show an example of 
the inequalities imposed by APs for m  =  3.
Si,j
^ 1 0  oo oo 1 0  0  oo 1 ^
\
1 0 o o o o l  0 |  0 0 O  
1 0 0 0 0 0 O  5 5 0 0 O
Xl,2
\  X3’3 /
<
\ T /
For the constructed instance, the optimal solution is to assign user i  to AP i  +1 , 
yielding maximum load 1. In the following, we show that the algorithm may assign 
user i  to AP i, resulting in maximum load m, which is a m-cornpetitive solution.
Set T  =  m. Consider the solution
=
— if k =  im
if k =  * +  1m
0 otherwise
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It satisfies with equalities all the non-zero constraints imposed by the APs and 
users. We can check that it is an extreme solution (note that it is the unique solu­
tion to the 2m, non-zero constraints). Since the algorithm only requires an arbitrary 
maximum matching from the fractional assignment, we can see that setting xiyi =  1 
gives a maximum matching. □
Since the known constant approximation algorithms in load balancing literature 
fail to provide constant approximation guarantee for our problem, it is natural to ask 
whether constant approximation algorithm exists. Answering this question leads to 
the work of [95], and we report it in a separate work due to independent interest.
Theorem 6  ([95]). For any constant c >  1, there does not exist a polynomial time 
algorithm that is c-competitive for GAS, unless N P  =  ZPP.
In this work, we are more interested in online algorithms, since users in a wire­
less network may come at any time. Currently, one of the best online algorithm 
for load balancing on unrelated machines is due to [22]. Their solution is e log m- 
competitive. We show in the following that this algorithm is still applicable to our 
problem. More importantly, we prove that competitive ratio is still e log m. This result 
is surprising in that (1) the competitive ratio is irrelevant of (2 ) the generalization 
does not increase difficulty for online algorithms. In addition, this competitive ratio 
is not far from the best we can do (up to a multiplicative constant e) for an online 
algorithm, since no online algorithm can do better than pog(m +  1)] as mentioned 
before.
The online AP selection algorithm runs as follows. When a new client appears 
(in online fashion), it will make an irrevocable association with one of the visible AP 
so that the Cp norm of the loads on all the APs within its transmission range, after 
its join, will be minimized at the moment. Since the client is unable to affect the 
other APs that are not in its hearing range, this algorithm will minimize the Cp norm
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of all the APs' loads in the system (C\ + ------\------- v £ pm)l/p in each new association
event. Then we have
Theorem 7. if the protocol is to minimize the Cp norm of the loads (rather than to 
minimize the maximum load), then the online protocol gives a r <  2l/p^ -competitive 
ratio
Proof. Suppose client 1,2,3, • • • , i , i + 1, • ■ ■ , n join the network sequentially. Con­
sider the situation when client i is joining the network. Let be the resulting load of 
AP j  if users 1 to i all follow our protocol (i may not select j) .  Let xiik be the indicator 
variable for the optimal choice such that xi)k =  1 if and only if user i chooses AP k 
in the optimal solution. With a little abuse of notation, we let 8itj =  Y,k xi,k8ij,k- Let 
Cj be the load on AP j  in the optimal solution for minimizing the £ p norm. We have 
C] =  $i,j- If users 1 to i - 1  follow our protocol but user i chooses the optimal AP,
then the load of the current system is ( A - 1,1 +  A - 1,2 +  ^,2, • • •, A - i j  +  5id, ...).
Following the main idea of [22], we derive that
-  c u j
j
<  + s<>r -  c U j )
j
<  +  <s«)p -
3
The first inequality is true because in this step client i tries to minimize the Cp 
norm. The second one is true because (x  +  8)p -  x p is increasing with x  when p >  1
and 8 >  0 .
105
E X
* i
s E E d ^ + y '- ^ )  (4-4>
t j
= E E K ^ + W X )
j *
< ((Ex)’+(Exy) -ix (4.6)
where (4.4) is due to (4.4); (4.5) is due to the fact that X)*=1((a: +  5j)p -  xp) < 
(x +  J2i=i Si)p - x p forp >  1, x  > 0, and S( >  0;4 (4.6) is due to Minkowski Inequality. 
Then
Let r  =  (J2j c?)>- We then have 2rP ^  (r +  X)P and r ^  w b i-
Thus, our protocol is a ^-competitive online algorithm to minimize the
Lp norm. □
Theorem 8 . The online protocol is a e log m  competitive protocol for minimizing the 
maximal load (or w r±  maximizing the minima! throughput).
Proof. Let the heaviest load among all APs running our protocol be £ m and the 
heaviest load among all APs in the optimal minimizing heaviest load protocol be L*m.
4lt can be proved by considering the function f ( s  +  t) — f (s )  -  / ( f )  where f (s )  =  ( x  +  s )p -  xp.
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T h u s . m ^  =  {m-C*Jg ) l /p >  ( E ,  £ ;P)^ >  H ' Z j Cnj )*  >  i W l/p =  lno ther 
words, the Cp norm protocol is a rm 1/p-competitive online algorithm for minimizing 
the heaviest load on all APs. r m l/p <  p =  Inm, m1/p^
reaches its minimum value, elogm, in the positive real number domain 1l+. Thus, 
we choose Cinm norm, and the competitive ratio, correspondingly, is e log m. □
Instead of being related to the number of APs and the ratio between the maximal 
and minimal rates, the competitive ratio of this protocol is linear to the logarithm of 
the number of APs, an almost constant competitive ratio for a small number of 
APs, which is deemed very promising since a constant competitive ratio algorithm 
usually gives a very good practical performance.
Furthermore, this algorithm has the advantage of computational simplicity and 
feasibility for practical implementation. The expected performance bound, for each 
client joined, is ensured just by the local network information at the moment it was 
coming as a new client. It is not necessary to reconsider its decision once a new 
association event occurs. In other words, our online algorithm takes exactly n  steps 
to finish. In the next section, we demonstrate that this algorithm can be employed 
as a practical and light-weighted association protocol for off-the-shelf wireless LAN 
adapters.
4.5 Protocol Implementation of SmartAssoc
In this section, we describe how to efficiently realize SmartAssoc with low costs. 
Although aforementioned online algorithm is carefully designed to avoid large over­
head caused by the measurement of nm? input parameters Sitjtk, SmartAssoc still 
needs to address the real-world issue before we apply it in practice. That is how 
to estimate APs' load within a short time frame. It should not require any modifi­
cation at the infrastructure side, so our implementation can be used in any open
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802.11 networks or networks the client is able to access. To solve this problem, 
we propose a distributed light-weight AP load probing method in our SmartAssoc 
implementation, so that message exchanges between users and/or APs are not 
necessary. The load information is obtained by the user from target AP without 
association.
We consider the scenario that wireless link is the bottleneck of a communica­
tion connection. The discussion of other cases is out of the scope of this chapter. 
Thus, the workload of an AP is reflected by the wireless traffic on air for this AP. 
Here we monitor the uplink stream traffic, ignoring the downstream, because ac­
curacy improvement of throughput measurement is small compared with the extra 
complexity in the implementation experience of [46]. Every channel is considered 
to be interference-free with others, as this type of interference is ignorable com­
pared to interference inside the channel. Thus, the computation of the Cp norm 
of the AP's workload can be reduced to per-channel based computation, while the 
comparison is still among all channels.
The implementation of SmartAssoc is taken on the popular commercial wireless 
LAN adapter by taking advantage of the legacy standard 802.11 protocol. User 
space control is provided by the Click Modular Router toolkit [5], while association 
functionality of the MadWifi driver vO.9.4 [9] is directly taken over by SmartAssoc in 
the monitor model.
As mentioned above, SmartAssoc requires to measure every AP's load on the 
same channel when a client i joins a candidate AP j  5. A natural way to obtain 
this information is to let the client i perform an association operation with j ,  and 
generate traffic on j  while at the same time capturing an uplink data stream for 
each AP by passive listening. The packet retransmission and duplication does not 
count. However, the association process consumes a lot of time, especially for
5Assume i always has some communication demand after association
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encrypted wireless networks. When the set of association candidates is not small, 
the user is not able to bear waiting so long. Nevertheless, sending data packets 
without association will lead to rejection from the object AP because of the IEEE
802.11 standard. Thus, we find a more light-weight way to obtain the equivalent 
load information without association. Currently 802.11 standards require an AP to 
respond to probe requests, even if the request is sent by a station not associated 
with the AP 6. We leverage this to create a packet type to replace the real data 
packet in the MAC layer. The intuition is to generate modified probe request traffic 
to the object AP j ,  similar to the data traffic, to estimate other APs' loads as if the 
client % is associating with j .  The detail modifications of the probe request packet 
are made as follows.
• We make the probe request uni-cast, forcing the target AP to return an ACK 
upon receiving the packet. This behavior is similar to a station transmitting 
data packets to an AP. And this process is important as well for calculating 
the throughput.
• We change the subtype flag in the packet header to prevent the AP from 
returning a probe response, in order not to introduce unnecessary traffic to 
the network.
• The packet size, transmission rate, and inter-arrival time of modified probe 
requests are packet-wisely customizable by the user, which is able to pro­
vide more accurate throughput information for specific estimation based on 
upper-layer applications. This feature is implemented in the probing genera­
tor module. Its performance is shown in the next section.
We also implement an AP filter to make the candidate AP list programmable. The 
user can select a preferred channel, network, and minimal RSSI threshold to cus­
6lt is done automatically by the firmware, transparent to the upper layers
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tomize the list. Only qualified APs will be considered for estimation to reduce over­
head.
The implemented protocol is described as pseudo code (Algorithm 1). A list of 
candidate APs is determined in the first place for estimation according to the bea­
cons. In the list, the candidates from the same channel i group as a set Ct. For 
each target AP j  in Cu the user injects a probing traffic, which consists of modi­
fied probe request packets, to the AP j ,  while measuring all members' loads. After 
these measurements, the user can calculate the Cv norm loads for all members 
within this channel set, (52keCi £ P)1/p- where p is the natural logarithm of the num­
ber of APs. This Cp norm value, influenced by association with the target AP, will 
be compared with the current best candidate AP among all channels. The compar­
ison strategy applied in the best candidate updating stage is controlled through two 
programmable parameters. The first one is the norm-difference threshold Tnd, and 
the second one is RSSI-difference threshold Trd. If the norm for the target AP are 
at least Tnd smaller than the norm for the current best AP, the target AP will be the 
best candidate AP instead of current one. Otherwise, the algorithm continues to 
check whether this norm is just smaller than the current best candidate's, as well as 
whether the target AP's RSSI is at least Trd more than the best candidate's. If so, 
the target AP will be the best; for all other cases, we keep the current best AP with­
out updating. The user treats every member of a channel set as the target member 
respectively, and repeats this process for each channel set. After the evaluation of 
all candidate APs, the user will associate with the final best candidate AP.
4.6 Evaluation
We verify the feasibility of our online algorithm and demonstrate the performance of 
SmartAssoc implementation in this section. Each client is powered by a 1.6 6 GHz
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Algorithm 1 Protocol Description
Discovers all available APs 
Applies the filter on discovered APs 
Puts all filtered APs into candidate list 
for each C{ do 
for each AP j  in C* do 
Generates a probing traffic to j  
Estimates the new load of each AP within Q 
Calculates the Cp norm change 
Updates the best candidate AP according to Tnd and Trd 
end for 
end for
Associates with the best candidate AP
CPU with 1 GB RAM, running on Linux kernel 2.26.24. A D-Link WNA-2330 with 
Atheros 5312 chipset wireless card is used.
4.6.1 Application Aware Probing
Since our modified probing stream, used to emulate the real data stream, is pro­
grammable in terms of the packet size, inter-arrival time, and transmission rate, it 
is easy to generate specific streams to mimic the data stream of a certain applica­
tion. Thus, the client is able to find out the "best" association AP with respect to the 
application it wants to use. Figure 4.1 demonstrates how similar our probing can 
be to the secure copy (SCP) and VoIP protocols, respectively. The SCP protocol 
used is the Unix scp command line program. SCP transfers a single file from a 
laptop to a remote desktop on the Internet through a commercial AP on the chan­
nel 6  with RSSI -58. The packet size of the probe emulating SCP is 1500 bytes, 
and the inter-arrival time is presented at the right of Figure 4.1. On the left side of 
Figure 4.1, we choose Skype as the VoIP application to set up a communication 
between two laptops through the same commercial AP on the channel 1 with RSSI 
-33. The probing packet used in this experiment is 200 bytes on average. For both 
experiments, we first brought up our driver module to create virtual interfaces in
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the kernel for all upper-layer applications. Then a script was executed to associate 
with the target AP in each experiment. After association and IP assignment, we ran 
the application and our probing generator to generate the traffic, respectively. The 
traffic traces are captured by Wireshark for cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
calculation of the inter-arrival time. In these two experiments, the transmission rate 
for all streams is fixed at 36Mbps.
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Figure 4.1: Upper-layer application stream emulations.
4.6.2 Measurement Accuracy
The APs' load information needed in SmartAssoc is derived by monitoring the wire­
less channels. Although it is not necessary for monitoring to capture all packets on 
the air, a relatively accurate measurement can help to make a better association 
decision. Thus we conducted a series of experiments to investigate the capture 
missing, which is the main factor to cause the measurement error of the load. In 
this chapter, we are focusing on the Atheros 5212 chipset, while other chipsets can 
be easily studied like this as well. We set up two laptops with a distance of 10 feet 
between them. One is the target laptop, which is used to generate a data stream for 
measurement. The other laptop acts as the monitor to estimate the data throughput
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from the target laptop. To make our experiment comprehensive, we use different 
transmission rates when transmitting the data streams. The rates used are 1 Mbps, 
2Mbps, 5.5Mbps, 11Mbps, 18Mbps, 36Mbps, and 54Mbps. We also use different 
inter-packet times of 5ms, 10ms, 15ms, and 20ms at each rate, respectively. The 
packet size in all trials is 1000 bytes, and every trial last 5 seconds for data stream 
generating and capturing. The experiment results are shown in Figure 4.2. The x  
axis presents the captured packet number in each trial at the monitor laptop side, 
while the y axis presents the number of transmitted packets counted at the target 
laptop side. It is clear that if there is no error, all points (star or circle) should fall on 
the green dash line y =  x. Based on these experimental results (excluding the six 
outliers), we are able to calculate the best linear fitting by using the Least Square 
method, which is shown as the red line, y =  0.8806 x x . 0.8806 is used for estimation 
calibration with respect to the Atheros 5212 chipset, i.e., estimation =  meaQU^ e~
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Figure 4.2: Calibration Experiments for Atheros 5212 chipset
4.6.3 Measurement Duration
The long measurement time of channel traffic, although it benefits the accuracy of 
workload estimations, extends the delay time before associations and consumes
normal result 
outlier
best linear fitting
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more power. Thus, we conducted experiments to find out what is the minimum 
measurement duration given certain measurement error. To facilitate experiments, 
we implemented a testing program based on lib p c a p . It has two functionalities. 
The first one is a standalone component of AP workload estimation described in 
our protocol. The second one is a wireless traffic generator that can assemblies
802.11 packets of our choice and transmits them at given traffic patterns. Two lap­
tops installed this testing program are set in 5.18 GHz of 802.11a. One of them 
is used to generate a traffic to one AP set in the same channel. The inter-arrival 
time of generated wireless traffic follows the exponential and normal distributions 
respectively. The other one is to estimate this AP's workload in different time win­
dows. The experimental results are illustrated in Fig 4.3 and Fig 4.4. We found out 
50 ms is a proper duration that can achieve less than 3 percent estimation errors.
2
probing duration probing duration
Figure 4.3: Estimation of workloads generated by two traffic patterns following exponential 
distributions with mean of ^  and respectively. X axis is different traffic measurement 
time from 0.001 seconds to 2 seconds. Y axis is the estimated workloads in packets per 
second.
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Figure 4.4: Estimation of workloads generated by two traffic patterns following normal dis­
tributions. In the left figure, the mean of distribution is 961 with standard deviation of 1, 
while in the right one, the mean is 964 with standard deviation of 4. X axis is different traffic 
measurement time from 0.001 seconds to 2 seconds. Y axis is the estimated workloads in 
packets per second.
4.6.4 Comparison Experiment
We conduct an experiment to compare our association method of SmartAssoc 
with other practical ones, the Best-throughput and Best-RSSI strategies. Best- 
throughput here is one special case of the selfish strategy, of which the conver­
gence speed can be bad. It means every client will make an irrevocable association 
decision to maximize its own throughput. In the experiment, there are three APs 
consisting of an extended service set (ESS) and four wireless LAN clients. Two of 
the APs (AP-1 and AP-3), whose process capabilities are relatively stronger than 
the thirds , are set in channels 1 and 11, respectively, and the third one (AP-2) is 
set in channel 11 as well. Three of the four clients, STA-1, STA-2 and STA-4, are 
put close to each other. Detailed settings are shown in Table 4.2.
The experiment includes four trials. In each trial, clients came to join the ESS 
one by one by using the same association strategy. It is reasonable because that, 
in real world, the time to perform the association operation is statistically much
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Table 4.2: Comparison Experiment Settings
APs
ID Model Channel
AP-1 LinkSys WRT54G CH 11
AP-2 D-Link DI-713P CH 11
AP3 LinkSys WRT54G CH 1
Clients
ID Adapter Pkt payload 
(byte)
Inter-pkt
time(ms)
Transmission
rate(Mbps)
STA-1 internal 1000 5 2
STA-2 internal 1000 5 11
STA-3 external 1000 5 11
STA-4 external 1000 5 11
smaller than the inter-arrival time between new users, so the possibility that two 
clients will want to join the ESS at the same time is low. After joining, the client will 
generate traffic using the configuration in table 4.2 to the associated AP. A trial was 
repeated three times, one for each association strategy.
The minimum client throughput for each strategy in the four trials are presented 
in Figure 4.5. Our algorithm performs better than the other two because it can 
balance the APs' workloads and reduce the interference among all wireless nodes. 
The performance of the Best-throughput is unstable, and it also indicates that the 
selfish strategy cannot compete with ours under similar overhead costs. Meanwhile 
the Best-RSSI strategy often makes all clients associate with the same AP.
4.6.5 Overhead
All three protocols mentioned above need an AP discovery phase. However, Best- 
RSSI does not have any other overhead, whereas Best-throughput and our protocol 
need extra time to evaluate every discovered AP. For each channel, our protocol 
only spends a small amount of time on the channel measurement, compared with 
the Best-throughput one. Nevertheless, the Best-throughput protocol requires real 
de-association and re-association operations, including the IP assignment, before 
every measurement. These operations consume a lot of time, from 3 sec to 8 sec.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison Experiment Results
When the AP number grows, the Best-throughput protocol spends much more time 
than ours. Therefore, the overhead of the selfish protocol, which is equivalent to 
multiple runs of the Best-throughput protocol, is even worse. Thus, our protocol is 
the most efficient one.
4.7 Simulation Result
We use simulations to evaluate our association protocol SmartAssoc on a larger 
scale with more wireless nodes and various configurations. We use NS2 version 
2.33 as our simulator. The multiple channel feature is patched into the NS2 wireless 
portion following the instructions of [76]. The MAC layer type is 802.11, while the 
radio propagation model is two-ray-ground. Ad-Hoc routing protocol is disabled 
since we are focusing on the infrastructure type of wireless LAN. The RTS/CTS 
mechanism is also disabled. The data traffic for users is a UDP stream with a 
packet size of 1000 bytes and average inter-arrival time of 1 ms. The transmission 
rate is set to 11 Mbps. The selected channels include 1,4, 5 ,6 , and 11 for covering 
the orthogonal and adjacent channel cases. The throughput measurements are
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between the wireless nodes.
We implement the following three practical association protocols for compari­
son.
1. Online. This is our proposed online algorithm in SmartAssoc. It is imple­
mented as described in Algorithm 1.
2. Selfish. The behavior of Selfish is defined in section 4.3. For the same reason 
that the convergence speed of selfish strategy can be very bad, we demon­
stratively run the protocol for 5 rounds. In the first round, the clients come to 
join the wireless LAN one by one. Each client will associate with every AP to 
measure the UDP throughput and pick the one who is able to offer the high­
est value. In each of the next four rounds, every client will repeat the above 
process to adjust its association based on current wireless LAN association 
topology. Finally, every client will keep its association with the AP it picks in 
the last round.
3. Ideal. This is the globally optimal association solution in terms of maximizing 
the minimum throughput over all clients. Ideal is obtained by enumerating all 
possible association topologies, given a specific scenario setting only includ­
ing the location and channel assignment information. In the real world, it is 
not practical because of its complexity.
Every experiment conducted below consists of many trials. Each trial has its 
own scenario configuration. The configuration provides the locations of all wireless 
nodes and the APs' channels. Both of these two information are randomly gener­
ated. Every throughput measurement, no matter whether it is for a data stream or 
probing stream, takes 3 seconds in the simulation.
The first simulation is to study the competitive ratio of online compared with 
ideal from the perspective of empirical experiments. The experimental value of the
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competitive ratio is a good indicator of the performance gap on average between 
the online and ideal. The statistically stable performance is also a concerned issue 
to the users in the real world. This experiment randomly picked 50 scenarios for 
testing. For every scenario, the competitive ratio in terms of the minimal client 
throughput, shown in Figure 4.6, is calculated based on the test result of online and 
ideal. The theoretical upper bound is also provided for comparison. The simulation 
results shows that about 86  percent of competitive ratio is above 0.47, and 70% are 
quit stable, just around 0.5. The worse competitive ratio among these 50 trials is 
0.313, while the theoretical upper bound, computed from is 0.232.
30
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Figure 4.6: Competitive ratio results, w.r.t. minimal client throughput, for 5 clients and 3 
APs within 20 x 20. The simulation repeated 50 times with different configurations.
Next, we conducted a scale-up comparison simulation between online and self­
ish, which includes three experiments to show the performance in large scale de­
ployments. In the first experiment, there are 10 clients and 3 APs within a rect­
angle of 30 x 30; the second one has 20 clients and 6  APs located in a rectangle 
of 90 x  90; 30 clients and 9 APs are involved in the third experiment within a rect­
angle of 150 x  150. Each experiment ran 30 trials. For each trial scenario, both 
our strategy and the selfish strategy were applied for the association processes 
of all clients on this setting, respectively. After finishing all users' association pro­
cesses, we measured the UDP traffic throughput for every client and found the 
minimum, T^ne for online and Taelfish for the selfish strategy. Then the minimal
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Figure 4.7: Simulation result for 10 clients and 3 APs within 30 x 30. The simulation repeated 
30 times. Each bar is the representative of minimum throughput difference for each trial. 
The results are sorted in ascending order
client throughput difference, shown in Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9, is calculated by 
using d i f f  =  -  Taetfish. These figures show that, even through the selfish
protocol is allowed to consume more time, our strategy is more often to perform 
better in terms of maximizing the minimum client throughput.
In the online strategy, since every client only needs to run our association once, 
the following clients in the future will not affect the behaviors of current associated 
clients. Meanwhile, for the selfish protocol, the unexpected new clients can easily 
break the current equilibrium into an unstable state, which will interrupt the usage 
of users. Thus, the online is more practical and less-intrusive. From the figures, it is 
shown that ours can, despite not knowing who will come to join the network, reduce 
the performance downgrade for the client who has the minimum throughput.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider the problem of AP association in WLAN. We present a 
theoretical analysis of the performance of two commonly used AP selection proto­
cols, and propose an online algorithm with a provable good competitive ratio. The
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Figure 4.8: Simulation result for 20 clients and 6 APs within 90 x 90. The simulation repeated 
30 times. Each bar is the representative of minimum throughput difference for each trial. 
The results are sorted in ascending order
association protocol based on this algorithm is implemented on the real testbed in 
a light-weight way. We evaluated our scheme using a combination of implemen­
tation on commodity hardware and extensive simulation. We demonstrate that it 
is promising that by combining our theoretical understanding and real system im­
plementation experience, a new, practical, and better AP association protocol is 
possible.
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Figure 4.9: Simulation result for 30 clients and 9 APs within 150 x 150. The simulation 
repeated 30 times. Each bar is the representative of minimum throughput difference for 
each trial. The results are sorted in ascending order
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5 Implantable Medical Device Secu­
rity
The rapid advances of bioengineering are introducing a boom of wireless accessi­
ble IMDs. Millions of patients experience the benefits from IMDs in regulating heart 
rhythm, controlling blood pressure, improving hearing, providing visual sight, and 
so on. In the near future, IMDs are expected to be Internet aware, and become 
a crucial component in pervasive systems such as smart homes and hospitals, 
making IMDs' security important. Researchers have identified that IMDs are facing 
potential security threats which may cause life threatening consequences. Recent 
investigations on pacemakers [41] revealed security vulnerabilities on existing com­
mercial offerings that allow, among other attacks, a malicious entity to reprogram 
the IMD. Thus, any vulnerability has to be addressed before further integration of 
IMDs into an intelligent environment can be realized.
Unlike conventional embedded systems, engineering security into IMDs presents 
the unique challenge. Security mechanism enforcing protection all the time may 
lead to troubles when safety tops secure operations of IMDs. To illustrate, consider 
an ER doctor, who is not recognized as legitimate operator in terms of security, 
may have to access the IMD to save the patient's life in an emergency situation. 
Temporary authorization to the doctor is not a reliable solution since the IMD owner 
in this circumstance may be physically incapable of doing this or remote trusted
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authority is not available.
Intuitively, we want a security mechanism resembling an on/off switch to con­
trol security protections. The switch can be triggered off in an emergency without 
assistance from the patient, but in a non-emergency situation, the patient has full 
control over who has access to his device. (This does open the IMD to attack in 
an emergency, but life-threatening conditions trump such concerns.) Researchers
j
have advocated pairing the IMD with an external device to provide security for the 
IMD, where in an emergency, the doctors can simply remove the external device 
and proceed to interact with the IMD without further hindrance.
There are two challenges when using an external device to protect the IMD. 
First, the external device and the IMD should have a means of establishing a se­
cret without prior knowledge. In other words, we should not pre-deploy any secret 
inside the IMD. This is to avoid situations where the user is unable to recall the 
pre-deployed secret and needs to rekey the IMD. The conventional solution is to 
use a manual switch to "reset" the IMD, but since the IMD is implanted inside the 
patient's body, this solution is unsuitable. The second challenge is to have a re­
liable method to prevent an adversary from convincing the IMD that the external 
device is absent. Since the IMD is inside the patient's body and the external device 
is placed outside the body, we have to rely on the wireless communication to relay 
information. This opens up a possibility for the adversary to jam the channel to cre­
ate the appearance that the external device is absent. Thus it is crucial to ensure 
IMDs to correctly distinguish between real emergency and an attack.
In this chapter, we propose IMDGuard, a security scheme for implantable car­
diac devices1, which are implanted to monitor or treat cardiac medical conditions. 
Those IMDs are one widely utilized group of medical devices, and examples in­
clude implantable cardioverter-defibrillator, pacemaker, and ECG (electrocardio­
1 We refer IMDs as implantable cardiac devices in the rest of chapter
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gram) sensor. IMDGuard leverages the Guardian, an external wearable device, to 
coordinate interactions between the IMD and the doctor in such a way that provides 
the security in a regular condition, and safely allows access in an emergency. The 
patient's ECG signals are exploited to extract keys shared exclusively between the 
IMD and Guardian. This key extraction scheme does not need any pre-distributed 
secret so that it is easy to rekey the IMD when the Guardian is lost or malfunctioning. 
Moreover, it makes the adversary unable to forge fake Guardians except through 
physical contacts with the patient. IMDGuard also can effectively prevent the ad­
versary capable of jamming from spoofing the IMD that the Guardian is absent. 
The adversary’s deception will be revealed by collaborations between the IMD and 
Guardian through the notification mechanism based on the defensive jamming.
The rest of the chapter is as follows. We review the related work in Section 5.1, 
and the background and problem formulation in Section 5.2. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 
detail the IMDGuard scheme including running time protocols and key initializa­
tion between IMD and Guardian, and Section 5.5 describes our prototype imple­
mentation. We provide evaluation on our scheme in Section 5.6, and conclude in 
Section 5.7.
5.1 Related work
The increase use of IMDs has motivated researchers to study the security issues on 
such devices [32,40,41]. Their proposed solution while secure, does not address 
what happens in an emergency situation where the doctors are unable to obtain 
the necessary keys from the patient.
Later work by [31] explored the concept of safety, and proposed the idea of 
fail-open, a property to physically circumvent the IMD's security protection in an 
emergency, through the use of an external device. This introduces a new security
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threat whereby an adversary may attempt to induce the fail-open state to access 
the IMD. Our proposed protocol also provides the fail-open property, but differs 
from [31] in three aspects. First, our design avoids the periodic message broadcast­
ing which consumes considerable battery power and exposes patients to privacy 
risks. Second, our solution protects the IMD without any assumption on the adver­
sary's transmission capability. Third, our scheme is comprehensive and evaluated 
on resource constrained embedded systems.
Our solution includes a spoofing attack resistant mechanism related to jamming. 
Jamming in sensor networks have been studied by [49,58, 92]. However, such 
jamming protocols do not consider the features of the IMD, and cannot be directly 
used in our problem. Other anti-jamming strategies like [83] and Direct-Sequence 
Spread Spectrum modulation also cannot be applied because of the hardware lim­
itation and the band regulation [15].
Our solution also includes a key extraction algorithm from ECG signals to secure 
the link between the IMD and the Guardian. The idea of using physiological signals 
to secure inter-sensor communications was first introduced in [27], and Poon etal. 
[71] put this scheme into practice for ECG and PPG (photoplethysmogram) signals. 
Inter-pulse intervals (IPIs) of heartbeats are exploited to extract keys in [20]. For 
16 consecutive individual IPIs, the ending time in millisecond (ms) of each IPI is 
calculated, setting 0 as the start time of the first IPI. Then the 7th and 8 th digits of 
the binary representations of the ending times are extracted to form the key. Even 
though the extracted binary sequences can pass several NIST [77] randomness 
tests, they are actually not random as what they look. Since the average IPI is 
about 850 milliseconds, the 7th and 8 th digits of the ending time are not random at 
all. The randomness lies in the lower digits, so does the error. Compared with it, 
our solution explored a new way to correctly utilize IPIs for extracting randomness.
A faster scheme was proposed by [87] where the coefficients of Fast Fourier
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Transform (FFT) on sampled ECG signals are used to extract keys, however, the 
paper also does not give a rigorous analysis whether input samples contain suffi­
cient entropy to generate a key with required entropy bits, and it evaluates the key 
after hashing, which is not logically correct. Our key extraction scheme differs from 
this work in two facets. First, we give rigorous information theoretical study on the 
randomness of the physiological feature from which the key is extracted. Second, 
we show that the adversary cannot get any knowledge about the generated keys 
except he can measure the ECG signals simultaneously without being caught.
5.2 Background and Formulation
In this section, we first show the configuration of IMDGuard, then the adversary 
model, and finally the approach against the adversary.
5.2.1 IMDGuard Configuration
IMDGuard has three components, the IMD, Guardian, and programmer. The IMD, 
once implanted, is expected to remain inside the body for an extended period of 
time. The programmer, as an outside controller, provides doctors an interface to 
interact with IMD through radio frequency transmission for adjusting running param­
eters, changing operation modes, or retrieving stored data. Above two are standard 
wireless programmable medical instruments. The Guardian is a wearable device 
with more power and computational resources than the IMD. This Guardian works 
as a proxy for the IMD and performs the authentication on its behalf. Both the 
IMD and the Guardian are capable of measuring ECG signals. The interactions of 
these components are illustrated in Fig. 5.1. Link a  represents the access control 
process between the Guardian and the programmer. Link f} represents the initial 
pairing process between the IMD and the Guardian. Link 7  represents the secure
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Figure 5.1: Communication interactions in IMDGuard.
communication protected by the key assigned by the Guardian to both the IMD and 
the programmer.
5.2.2 Adversary Model
We consider an adversary whose goal is trying to program to or retrieve data from 
the IMD without being caught. The adversary succeeds if he is able to access in­
formation from the IMD in the presence of the Guardian. Disruption attacks like 
denial-of-service are excluded in our adversary model. We assume the adversary 
cannot physically measure the patient's real-time ECG signals without being de­
tected. We also assume that there is no adversary in an emergency situation. This 
is reasonable since in such a scenario, the patient with the IMD is likely to be in a 
secure facility like an ER room in a hospital which can limit the presence of adver­
saries.
We classify the attack strategy of adversary against IMDGuard into two aspects. 
The first is when the adversary tries to impersonate the Guardian by deriving the 
key shared between the IMD and the Guardian from either brute force searching 
or historic medical records of the patient. The second is when the adversary may
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spoof the absence of the Guardian by selectively jamming the messages from it, in 
order to convince the IMD to disable safety protection and switch to the emergence 
status.
5.2.3 IMDGuard Overview
In IMDGuard, the Guardian performs two essential functions. First, the Guardian 
is used to control which mode, regular or emergency, the IMD should enter. When 
the patient is wearing the Guardian, the IMD should function under the regular 
mode. In a regular mode, the programmer requiring to interact with the IMD will 
first be authenticated by the Guardian, which will then issue the appropriate keys 
to both the IMD and programmer. When the IMD does not detect the presence of 
the Guardian, the IMD should enter emergency mode. The advantage is that in 
an emergency, the doctor will be able to physically remove the Guardian and have 
unfettered access to the IMD.
Second, the Guardian will authenticate the programmer on behalf of the IMD. 
This will conserve the IMD's battery by reducing the number of operations per­
formed by the IMD. This also simplifies overall IMD design, since the IMD does 
not have to maintain cryptographic materials such as asymmetric keys and access 
control lists.
We assume that the Guardian will always be worn by the patient. It is reasonable 
since the Guardian can take the form of a watch and the patient can wear it all the 
time. We also assume that the adversary cannot physically remove the Guardian 
without the patient being aware of it.
We do not assume the IMD must associate exclusively with one Guardian. Thus 
before making the Guardian effective, it needs to be initialized by sharing a secret 
key between the IMD and this Guardian, so that they recognize each other. More­
over, in the extreme case that the Guardian current worn is broken or lost, a new
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Guardian can be paired with the IMD easily without the need of retrieving old key 
or resetting IMD.
To realize this functionality, one key feature of IMDGuard is a secure key estab­
lishment scheme based on ECG signals. Both the IMD and the Guardian locally 
sample the same random source simultaneously, the patient's ECG, and then ex­
tract a symmetric key from ECG features after ECG delineation. Unlike the Diffie- 
Hellman key exchange or wireless based key extractions, this scheme is robust 
against man-in-the-middle attacks as long as the adversary cannot physically mea­
sure real-time ECG signals of the patient.
The other key feature of IMDGuard is the spoofing attack resistant mechanism. 
If the adversary attempts to persuade the IMD to enter the emergency mode by jam­
ming all messages transmitted from the Guardian, the Guardian still can announce 
its presence to the IMD by jamming the IMD's transmission of the challenge mes­
sage. The intuition is that the Guardian may hardly block the transmission from the 
adversary to the IMD, since it has no knowledge about the adversary's hardware 
and capabilities. Instead, the Guardian can be calibrated to the parameters of its 
own IMD, and can always successfully jam its IMD's transmissions.
5.3 Protocol Design in IMDGuard
Here, we present the protocols of IMDGuard. We assume that the IMD and Guardian 
have already paired with a shared secret key after key establishment phase, which 
is described in the following section. We assume the Guardian has a list of le­
gitimate programmers and their corresponding public keys. This information can 
securely be installed when in the hospital. Table 5.1 summarizes the notations 
used.
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Table 5.1: Table of notations
G the Guardian
P the Programmer
nij the ith nonce generated by j ,  j  €  { I M D ,  G, P }
H( . ) standard cryptographic hash function, e.g., SHA-1
S K the shared secret key between the IMD and the Guardian 
using ECG based key extraction (Section 5.4)
P K f the public key of j ,  j  e {G,  P }
P K j the private key of j ,  j  e  {G,  P }
T K the temporary symmetric key used for one session
I D the identification of the IMD
5.3.1 Basic IMD Protocol
The IMD will periodically wake up to determine whether there is any request from 
the programmer. After the IMD receives a request from the programmer, the IMD 
will execute Algorithm 2. The IMD will send back its ID, and a random nonce uIimd, 
which is used as the session identity to resist against the replay attack. Then, the 
IMD starts a timer T i to wait for the Guardian, if present, to notify it to run the regular 
condition protocol. In the case that there is no message from the Guardian when 
Ti times out, the IMD will run the emergency condition protocol.
Algorithm 2 Basic IMD algorithm__________________________________________
1: Send back to the P,  ID and u I i m d  
2: Start waiting timer Ti
(Guardian, if present, will execute authentication protocol (Fig. 5.2) during T x) 
3: while T i time out == FALSE  do 
4: if receive valid message from G  then
5. Regular condition, not an emergency.
6: Execute Regular Condition Algorithm (Section 5.3.3)
7: end if
8: end while
9: Possible emergency condition.
Execute Emergency Condition Algorithm (Section 5.3.4)
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5.3.2 Guardian Authenticating Programmer
In Step 2 of Algorithm 2, the Guardian will authenticate the programmer within the 
time period Ti. The authentication protocol is shown in Fig. 5.2.
A random nonce n l G is signed by the programmer, and sent back to the Guardian 
along with another random nonce n l P. The signature of the programmer is veri­
fied by the Guardian. If it is not valid, the Guardian will inform the IMD to deny the 
session request through the message { N O , n l I M D } s K  (it will also inform the pro­
grammer the authentication is failed and session is denied). If valid, the Guardian 
will assign a temporary session key T K  to both the IMD and the programmer for 
the secure communication. We let the IMD use symmetric keys when communi­
cating with the programmer and Guardian to reduce the computational load on the 
IMD. The Guardian and programmer use public keys to authenticate each other for 
better key management.
G : Overhears msg in step 1 of Algorithm 2 (5.1)
G -+ P  : n l G (5.2)
G i P  • { n l G} PK- , n l p (5.3)
G : Verify the signature withPATji (5.4)
If incorrect, then
Deny the request and inform IMD and P
Authentication phase completed
If correct, then
Accept the request, and continue step(5)
G -► I M D  : { Y E S , T K , n l IMD}sK (5.5)
G P  : {Y E S , T K ,  n l p } PK+ (5.6)
Figure 5.2: Guardian authentication Programmer
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G  -> I M D  : (5.1)
I M D  : Decrypt to derive R (5.2)
If R  = =  { N O ,  ti I i m d } ,  then
Deny the request from P, and go to sleep
If/? = =  {Y E S , T K ,  nl/Mz?}, then
Accept req from P, and continue step(3)
P  - *  I M D  : {command}TK (5.3)
P  <— I M D  : {response^TK (5.4)
Figure 5.3: IMD regular condition protocol
P  <— I M D  : t& im d (5.1)
I M D  : Wait for time T2 (5.2)
P  I M D  ti3j m d (5.3)
P  -» I M D  : ans (5.4)
I M D  : Check ans (5.5)
if <zns! =  H ( u 2j m d  © ri3/M£>),then
Deny the request from P, and go to sleep
if ans = =  H(n2iMD  © ri3/A/u), then
Accept req from P, and continue step(6 )
P  —» I M D  : command (5.6)
P  •<— I M D  : response (5.7)
Figure 5.4: IMD emergency condition protocol
5.3.3 Regular Condition Protocol
When the IMD enters the regular condition (Step 6  in Algorithm 2), it will execute 
the protocol shown in Fig. 5.3. After decrypting the message R, the IMD will deny 
access if it receives a NO message. Otherwise, a YES message indicates that the 
programmer has been authenticated, and the session key for Steps 3 and 4 is T K .
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5.3.4 Emergency Condition Protocol
When the IMD enters the emergency mode, it will execute the protocol in Fig. 5.4, 
and send the first portion of the challenge, a random nonce u2IMd • After waiting 
T2 time, the IMD sends the second portion of the challenge, n3IMD• Assuming that 
the Guardian has been physically removed, the programmer will transmit back the 
correct answer to the challenge, H(n2IMD © n3IMD)- If the Guardian is present, 
the programmer will be unable to return the correct answer. We explain how the 
Guardian disrupts this in the next subsection.
5.3.5 Spoofing Attack Resistant Protocol
Here, we show how our protocol is resilient to adversary's spoofing attack based 
on jamming. The adversary can attempt to jam the communications between the 
IMD and Guardian to induce the IMD to enter the emergency mode in Step 7 of 
Algorithm 2. In other words, the adversary will jam the channel for length of time 
period Tx. Since the IMD does not receive any response from the Guardian, the 
IMD will proceed to execute the emergency condition algorithm. For this scenario,
G : Overhear the msg in Step 1 of Fig. 5.4 (5.1)
G : Jam the msg in Step 3 of Fig 5.4 (5.2)
G : Raise a warning alarm if Step 1 occurs frequently (5.3)
Figure 5.5: The notification mechanism of the Guardian
the Guardian function, the defensive jamming described in Fig. 5.5, is triggered to 
block this session. When the Guardian hears the first portion of the challenge mes­
sage (Fig. 5.4 Step 1) sent by the IMD to the programmer, the Guardian will realize 
that the communication link between the IMD and itself is blocked by an adversary 
with high probability. Then the Guardian will jam the second portion of challenge
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message from the IMD (Fig. 5.4 Step 3). This operation is feasible in practice based 
on the Guardian's loose synchronization through the message in Step 1 of Fig. 5.4. 
In other words, the Guardian will be aware that there is another message, which 
is the jamming target, going to send in T2 time later. This information can help the 
Guardian to jam the target message with less effort.
There are two advantages in letting the Guardian to jam the IMD's message 
instead of the adversary's message. First, the adversary's hardware may be much 
more powerful than the Guardian, making it difficult to calibrate the Guardian's 
broadcast strength needed to successfully jam the adversary's signal. Second, the 
the Guardian can time exactly when to be jamming since it is aware when the IMD 
will begin broadcast. This conserves the Guardian's power by reducing jamming 
period.
5.4 Key Establishment in IMDGuard
In the previous section, we assume there is a secret key already shared between 
the IMD and Guardian to secure their communication. However, this key establish­
ment is challenging if the IMD and Guardian do not share any secret beforehand. In 
this section, we introduce a secure key extraction scheme based on the ECG delin­
eation to establish a symmetric secret key bonding the IMD and Guardian together, 
making adversary impossible to forge the Guardian.
5.4.1 ECG Delineation
We conduct the ECG delineation with the wavelet-based algorithms mentioned 
in [54,57]. Fig. 5.6 shows an example result of our wavelet transform based de­
lineation. Using the information of local maxima, minima and zero crossings at 
different scales in the wavelet transform, the algorithm is able to detect all the sig­
135
nificant points of ECG in a heart beat cycle, first the R peak, then Q peak and S 
peak, followed by T wave and P wave.
{SCOT— *—  ^
Scale!
Figure 5.6: Wavelet transform of ECG waves at the first five scales. The first panel is the 
ECG signal, the other five, from top to the bottom, are the corresponding wavelet transforms 
from scale 21 to scale 25.
As shown in Fig. 5.6, in each heart beat cycle, the three blue lines in the mid­
dle denote the onset, R peak and offset of QRS complex respectively. The three 
cyan lines on the left denote the onset, P peak and offset of P wave respectively. 
The three red lines on the right denote the onset, T peak and offset of T wave 
respectively.
We implement the algorithms with TinyOS 2.1, with about 1200 lines of code. 
The high accuracy is achieved to reduce the mismatch rate of IPIs, making the 
following key extraction efficient.
5.4.2 An ECG Feature for Key Extraction
Given the two ECG measurements that are taken at different parts of the human 
body, we want to extract a symmetric key from them after the delineation. As a fun­
damental requirement, the key much be random. Thus, the key must be extracted 
from an ECG feature such that: (1) the feature itself is random; and (2) the feature 
has common places for both the IMD and Guardian.
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Table 5.2: The quality of randomness of each digit.
* Poo(%) Poi Pio Pn
1 29.2 24.4 24.4 21.9
2 28.9 24.3 24.4 22.4
3 25.2 24.6 24.7 25.5
4 27.9 25.6 25.6 20.9
5 57.5 18.8 18.8 4.9
6 2.5 13.2 13.2 71.1
7 99.1 0.4 0.4 0.0
8 99.7 0.1 0.1 0.0
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Figure 5.7: The fluctuation of IPIs against the average, which is 294 in unit of 4 ms (250Hz 
sampling rate).
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I PI fluctuations against average
Figure 5.8: The normal distribution fitting to the fluctuation of IPIs against the average, with
[i =  0 and <r2 = 61.
After the ECG delineating, we have the timing information of all the ECG sig­
nificant features, namely P wave, QRS complex and T wave, for every heart beat 
cycle. Since the ECG signals are periodic, to ensure the randomness, we cannot 
directly use all the delineation points at the same time. Once a feature is chosen, 
other features in the same heart beat cycle are not totally random any more. For in­
stance, if we know the position of the R peak, we can easily guess into what ranges 
the Q peak, S peak, T peak and P peak in the same cycle fall. Even for features 
in different cycles, the positions of features are not totally random. For example, 
given the position of R peak in one heart beat cycle, that of the following R peak 
will fall into a small range because the common inter-pulse interval (IPI) is known. 
(For adults, the common IPI is about 850 ms)
We will use the information of R peaks, which is most salient, to extract keys. 
Given a consecutive sequence of R peaks, IPIs are obtained by calculating the 
difference in time of the two consecutive R peaks. Suppose Ri denoting the time 
of the ith R peak, then IP R  =  Ri+1 -  Ri. Since the average value of IPI is quite
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known, we have to exclude the average value when extracting the key. First we 
empirically estimate how many random bits can be extracted from each IPI value. 
We convert IPI values to binary representations, then examine the randomness of 
each digit of the binary representations. It is clear that the random bits lie in the low 
digits. For the ith digit, we count the number of samples for the following cases:
(1) noo-' if the ith digit of sample j  is 0, and so is that of sample j  +  1, then 
increment noo by 1;
(2) n0i: if the ith digit of sample j  is 0, and that of sample j  4-1 is 1, then increment 
noi by 1;
(3) ni0: if the ith digit of sample j  is 1, and that of sample j +1 is 0, then increment
n l0 by 1;
(4) nni if the ith digit of sample j  is 1, and so is that of sample j  +  1, then 
increment n n  by 1;
where 1 <  j  <  n, n  is the total number of consecutive IPI samples.
We then calculate the four possibilities Pik =  nik/ { n - 1), where Ik e {00,01,10,11}. 
If the ith digit is random and independent, all the four possibilities should be around 
25%. We list the possibilities for the lower 8 digits of IPI samples in Table 5.2. We 
set a threshold of 5%. As shown in the table, the last 4 digits are random, while 
the 5th digit is not. For the 5th digit, Poo is more than 50% while Pn is less than 
5%. We also calculate the entropy of the fluctuations directly from the original data, 
which is around 5. Therefore, we can confidently extract 4 bits from each IPI.
5.4.3 Quantization
This subsection will show how to extract 4 random bits from each IPI sample. We 
cannot use the last 4 digits of IPI's binary representations directly, because the 
slight difference between the data at both sides may cause big differences in the 
last 4 digits of the binary representations, leading the mismatch rate to as high
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as 20%. Actually, the lower 4 digits are the fluctuations of IPIs. Fig. 5.7 shows 
the IPI fluctuations against the average value. In terms of entropy, the fluctuations 
don't lose any entropy of IPI samples. Though the average IPI is quite stable, the 
difference between individual IPI and the average value is unpredictable. It can 
be positive, negative or zero. And the value of the fluctuation is quite random in a 
certain range. So the fluctuations can be chosen as the basis to extract the key.
In the perspective of statistics, the fluctuations shape into a normal distribution. 
Fig. 5.8 shows the histogram of the samples in Fig. 5.7, with a normal distribution 
fitting. The fitted normal distribution also results in an entropy \ log(2-rreS2) =  5, 
which is within the range of that resulted from the original data. And we have proved 
that the last 4 digits are random, which implies that the real entropy is at least 4. In 
this sense, the distribution of the fluctuations is indeed a normal distribution, or at 
least close to.
IMDGuard provides the following algorithm to do the quantization. This algo­
rithm is based on the assumption that the fluctuations form a normal distribution. 
For a normal distribution JV(/z, a), given ^ and a, we can divide the probability den­
sity function into 16 consecutive sections such that, in each section, the cumulative 
possibility density is 1/16. The domain of each section can be denoted by a function 
of a and n, as shown in Table 5.3. If /x or any starting/ending point of any domain is 
an integer, we split samples with that value into two portions, with each going into 
one of the nearby domain. The splitting depends on the sample index. The sam­
ples with odd index form one portion, and those with even index form the other. 
Note that a is big enough such that every domain contains at least one integer, 
since the entropy indicates that a is not small. The purpose of the division is to 
roughly but not precisely equalize the number of samples in each domain, making 
the quantization unpredictable. The 16 domains are one-to-one mapping to the 
4-bit gray codes.
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Table 5.3: Normal distribution divided into 16 equal sections.
Domain Domain
1 (—oo, fi — 1.534cr) 9 (fi, fi +  0.157a)
2 (fi — 1.534a, n — 1.151 a) 10 (fi +  0.157a, fi +  0.319a)
3 (fi -  1.151a, n -  0.887a) 11 (fi +  0.319a, fi -1- 0.489a)
4 (fj, — 0.887a, fi — 0.675a) 12 (fi +  0.489a, fi -I- 0.675a)
5 (fi — 0.675a, fi — 0.489a) 13 (fi +  0.675a, fi +  0.887a)
6 (fi — 0.489a, fi — 0.319a) 14 (ft +  0.887a, fi +  1.151a)
7 (fi — 0.319a, ft — 0.157a) 15 (fi +  1.151a, fi +  1.534a)
8 (fi — 0.157a, fi) 16 (fi +  1.534a, + o o )
Since the IMD is measuring the ECG signals all the time, it is able to calculate 
a and fj, for a long period, say 15 minutes, and store it. During key generation, the 
IMD can send these parameters to the Guardian. This process doesn't leak any 
information about the key, since the adversary still doesn't know which sample is 
in which domain and how many samples are in each domain. The quantization is 
shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Quantization Algorithm_____________________
Input: n  consecutive IPIs from ECG, I P h ,  I P h , .... I  P h -  
Output: An bit binary string.
Obtain parameters fi and a
Calculate 16 domains based on Table 5.3: D x, D 2, ..., D i6 
Number the 4-bit gray codes: G u G2, ..., G lfi 
Output = (j> 
for i  <- 1 to n do 
for j  <r- 1 to 16 do 
if IP I i  falls into Dj then 
Output = Concatenate(Output, Gj) 
end if 
end for 
end for
5.4.4 Reconciliation
Due to the high accuracy of the ECG delineation, the two binary strings quantized 
respectively by the IMD and Guardian have a low mismatch rate. For two 4-bit
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blocks corresponding to the same heart beat cycle on both sides, one bit is different 
in most cases if there is a mismatch. In a very few cases, there are two bits different. 
There is no case that 3 or 4 bits are different. Based on these observations, we 
design a 2-round reconciliation algorithm. It carries out Round 2 only if Round 1 
fails.
Round 1: For each IPI, both the IMD and Guardian get a 4-bit block. Both sides 
calculate the parity of its own block and exchange this information. If the parities 
are different, the block is discarded. Otherwise, each side extracts the first 3 bits of 
the block; the 4th bit is discarded because the parity leaks one bit information. This 
process continues until both sides get 129 bits. The IMD then hashes it with SHA-1 
hash function and sends the hash value to the Guardian. The Guardian compares 
this hash value with its own, and notifies the IMD. If the two hash values match, the 
algorithm terminates. Otherwise, Round 2 will be carried out.
Round 2: For the 43 IPIs chosen in Round 1, both the IMD and Guardian calcu­
late the parity of the last 2 bits of each 4 bit block, and exchange this information. 
Again those blocks whose parities don't match are discarded. For the blocks left, 
both sides extract the 2nd and 3rd bits; the first bit is discarded since the second 
parity also leaks one bit information. Obviously, the length of the key is less than 
128. Then both sides continue to analyze the following IPIs. At this time, they check 
two parities at the same time and extract 2 bits from each block which passes the 
parity check. The process continues until both sides get 128 bits.
5.5 Prototype Implementation
A challenge involving IMD experiments is the difficulty in obtaining source codes 
and open platforms from commercial vendors. In our prototype system, we choose 
the TelosB with TinyOS 2.1, an open research platform of the resource constrained
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embedded system as a replacement of the IMD. The related details are described 
below.
Transmitter Comparison: The TelosB utilizes the CC2420 transmitter for wire­
less communication. The CC2420 is comparable to the typical Medical Implant 
Communication Service (MICS) radio like ZL70101 [14] used in IMDs. They both 
are low power radio devices with similar amount of power consumption during trans­
mission. The ZL70101 expends 5 mA, while 8.5 mA is achievable for the CC2420. 
Besides, both of them share other common features such as multiple channel and 
duty-cycle support. The difference between CC2420 and ZL70101 is that MICS 
radio operates lower frequency band between 402-405 M H z  because of the rea­
sonable signal propagation characteristics in the human body. This has no impact 
on our evaluation since our implementation does not rely on the frequency or num­
ber of available channels.
Code size: The code size of each component after compilation is shown in 
Table 5.4. ECC [88] is the Elliptic Curve Cryptography we develop to provide public 
key scheme between the programmer and the Guardian. For reference, a typical 
IMD produced in 2002 is able to contain 2MB memory [31].
Table 5.4: Code size of our prototype implementation
Module ROM (bytes) RAM (bytes)
IMD 20656 1056
Programmer 20754 1060
Guardian 20614 1050
ECC 42190 1931
Key Extraction 10078 887
ECG Delineation 18720 9652
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5.6 Evaluation of IMDGuard
The performance evaluation of IMDGuard is divided into three portions. First, we 
comprehensively assess the quality of the key extracted from ECG signals. Then 
we conduct a series of experiments on the effectiveness of defensing adversary's 
spoofing attacks. Finally, we present the efficiency of each critical components in 
our implementation.
5.6.1 Key Establishment
In this section, we will evaluate the key generated according to the algorithms in 
Section 5.4. The ECG signals are from PhysioBank database (http://www.physionet.org/physio 
We will address three important characteristics of the key: (1) temporal variance;
(2) efficiency; (3) randomness.
5.6.1.1 Temporal Variance
Given a 128-bit key generated by the IMD and Guardian, we want to know whether 
the adversary can get any help if he can access historic/future records of ECG sig­
nals of the patient. Metric used is the hamming distance between the key and any 
other 128 bit random string before or after it. The hamming distance between two 
binary strings of equal length is the number of positions at which the correspond­
ing symbols are different. Given two random strings, if they are independent, the 
possibility of having hamming distance k follows a binomial distribution, which is 
p(k) =  ( £ ) p * ( l - £>)"“*, where n =  128 and p -  1/2. And the mean value of k, a.k.a 
expected value, is E(k) =  np -  1/2 x 128 =  64.
We examine these hamming distances. There is no signal value equal to 0 or 
128, and all the points lie between 45 and 85. The closer to the mean hamming 
distance, which is 64, the denser the points. We plot the possibility of the hamming
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distances, as shown in Fig. 5.9. As we can see, the measured data matches very 
well with the theoretical binomial distribution with n =  128 and p =  1 /2 . From the 
statistical prospective, the 128 bit key generated by our scheme does not relate to 
the historic ECG or future ECG signals. Thus, even the adversary gets historic or 
future ECG data of the patient, he cannot get any help from it. This also indicates 
the randomness of the 128 bit key.
We also conduct the same evaluation between keys generated from ECG sig­
nals from different persons, and we get the same result as expected. The his­
toric/future record of the same person does not help the adversary, neither does 
that of other people. [87] did similar evaluation about their scheme. However, they 
did so after hashing an identical string between two parties with a one-way hash 
function. Though they got similar results, their results could not prove what they 
claimed. Hashing will make a string random, no matter the original string is random 
or not.
5.6.1.2 Efficiency
In the reconciliation phase, there are two rounds. In the first round, 3 random bits 
are extracted from each IPI. So it needs 43 IPI to get a 128 bit key. If the first 
round fails, the algorithm will carry out the second round, extracting 2 bits from 
each IPI. In this case, it needs 21 more IPIs besides the 43 IPIs in the first round. 
In 88% cases, the first round succeeds. The second round succeeds all the time, 
at least we did not find a single failure in all our traces. Thus, on average, it needs 
45.5 IPIs, without counting the IPI discarded. During Round 1, about 25% samples 
are discarded, and during Round 2, only 0.3% samples are discarded. Taking into 
account the samples discarded, it needs 61 IPIs, corresponding to 45 seconds or 
so, to generate a key successfully.
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Figure 5.9: The hamming distances between the 128 bit stream from current ECG signal 
and those from historic records fit into a binomial distribution with n =  128 and p =  1/2.
5.6.1.3 Randomness
To evaluate randomness of the generated bit stream employed as secret keys, we 
run the randomness tests in the NIST test suite [77]. There are totally 15 different 
statistical tests, and we run 9 of them. The other 6 require a very long bit stream 
that we cannot generate from PhysioBank database. Our bit stream passes all the 
9 tests, showing a good quality of randomness.
Evaluations show that even the patient's ECG records cannot help the adver­
sary to predict the key shared between the IMD and Guardian, unless he physically 
measure patient's ECG signals simultaneously during the key establishment. How­
ever it is impossible for the adversary to physically measure patient's ECG without 
the patient being aware of it. This key establishment is robust to man-in-the-middle 
attack. If a symmetric key is successfully established, then the Guardian must be 
legitimate.
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Figure 5.10. Results for the effectiveness of Guardian's jamming when targeting at mali­
cious programmer. X-axis represents the distance between the IMD and Guardian, and 
Y-axis is the success ratio of delivered messages. For each distance, ten trials were con­
ducted.
5.6.2 Jamming Related Experiments
There are two jamming related experiments. First, we experimentally validate our 
decision to jam the IMD's communication instead of the adversary's messages. 
Second, we examines our defensive jamming method using different settings in 
terms of the power level and the distance.
We let three TelosB motes to act as the IMD, the Guardian and the malicious pro­
grammer (adversary). To concentrate on the jamming performance of the Guardian, 
these motes are installed with the simplified IMDGuard which will be described in 
each experiment below, as well as the carrier sensing and random backoff on motes 
are disabled. All the experiments are taken on a large office table in an indoor en­
vironment.
Experiment 1: We vary the distance between the IMD and Guardian from 0.5 
feet to 2 feet, and set the malicious programmer 11 feet away from the center point
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of these two devices. The transmission power of the Guardian is configured to be 
-15 dBm. This is 10 dB  higher than the power of the IMD but is 10 dB  lower than 
the malicious programmer's power. The transmission interval, i.e. the inter arrival 
time between any two messages, is 20 ms. We then let the adversary send mes­
sages to the IMD, while the Guardian is jamming. After the transmission is over, we 
determine the ratio of messages successfully received by the IMD. The results are 
shown in Fig. 5.10. As we can see, messages toward the IMD are able to escape 
from being jammed with an uncertain probability, low in some cases but high in 
others. This observation indicates that jamming the adversary's transmission does 
not work in practice since our malicious programmer settings, such as the relative 
power strength (10 dB) and location (11 feet), or even more rigorous conditions, 
can be achieved by an adversary.
We then repeat the experiment again, this time letting the Guardian jam the 
IMD's transmission. The Guardian is able to successfully jam all the messages. 
This approach is more reliable and effective than jamming the adversary. We omit 
the figure for the results. The success of defensive jamming is due to the fact that 
the Guardian is aware of all of the IMD's settings, and that the Guardian is more 
powerful than the IMD by design.
Experiment 2: In this experiment, the Guardian jams the message the IMD 
sends to the malicious programmer in the same way as above experiment but under 
various settings. The distance between the IMD and the malicious programmer is 
fixed at 1 foot, which is considered as the closest position the malicious could have 
without being detected by the patient. The Guardian is placed away , from 1 foot to 
7 feet, from the center point of IMD and programmer at each different power level. 
The successful delivery ratios of all transmitted messages in every condition are 
recorded in Fig. 5.11. It is evident that, as long as the Guardian is close enough, 
e.g. within 2 feet to the IMD, the transmission from the IMD toward the malicious
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programmer is totally blocked even in the extreme testing case that Guardian's 
jamming power is 20 dB less than the IMD's. This observation is important because 
the IMD usually is fallen into this distance range if the Guardian is worn by the 
patient.
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Figure 5.11: Results of the effectiveness of Guardian's defensive jamming(acted as jam­
mer) when targeting at the IMD. X-axis means the distance between the Guardian and 
center point of the IMD and malicious programmer in feet, and Y-axis is the success ra­
tio of delivery. The transmission power of the IMD is set to be -5 dBm during the whole 
experiment. For each distance, two trials were conducted.
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5.6.3 Overhead Evaluation
Cryptographic overhead: We write a testing program on TelosB to record the 
average timing of ECC-based encryption/decryption, SHA-1 hash, Advanced En­
cryption Standard (AES) for a 20 byte message, and data is shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Security Timing Information
Encryption Decryption SHA-1 Hash AES
3.3 s 1.7 s 4 ms 1 ms
Communication and Operation Overhead: The timing information for the crit­
ical operations under different scenarios is provided in the Table 5.6. In an authen­
tication case, on average the Guardian takes 3821 ms to authentication a pro­
grammer in total. It is broken down to (1) 1550 ms for programmer to generate a 
signature of the given challenge (20 byte random data), (2) 2221 ms for Guardian 
to verify this signature, and (3) 50 ms for other communication overhead. When the 
Guardian is not present, the process of emergency condition (Fig 5.4) costs roughly 
512+14=526 ms before the IMD accepts the programmer. If the defensive jamming 
occurs, the session will be denied by the IMD in about 1501 ms since receiving the 
request.
Table 5.6: Prototype Timing Information
Overhead in Time (ms)
Situation Operation Overhead
Authentication
Signing(20bytes)
Verification(20bytes)
Others
1550
2221
50
Guardian Removed Challenge Transfer Others
512
14
Guardian Jamming Session Deny 1501
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5.7 Conclusion
/
In this chapter, we propose IMDGuard, a comprehensive security scheme for pro­
tecting implantable cardiac devices in terms of both security and reliability. Proto­
type of IMDGuard is implemented to demonstrate its functionality of securing IMDs 
in practice.
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6 Conclusion
More and more people rely on pervasive computing systems, including smart­
phones, body area sensors, laptops and so on. The performance of these sys­
tems directly influences user experience, and some of their drawbacks may cause 
serious outcomes in the real world. Among all the existing problems, security and 
energy efficiency are the most critical because of following reasons. First, personal 
computing devices consume a lot of energy in order to complete desired heavy-duty 
tasks. The lifetime of a battery is reduced a lot because of this and users are not 
satisfied. Second, many personal mobile devices access a lot of valuable user data 
under risky circumstances, but they are not protected by comprehensive security 
schemes because of their limited resources. These two serious problems make 
people hesitant to adopt and further depend on pervasive computing systems.
There are four projects involved in our research. We introduce a new way to 
measure the power consumption of smartphones without any external hardware 
assistance. This enables self-constructive modeling for every individual phone. 
As such generated power models are accurate and can adapt to any system con­
figuration changes in real time. Based on this technique, we improve the energy 
efficiency of smartphone applications, taking the email sync over the cellular net­
work as one example. The findings of our study on email sync can guide appli­
cation developers to improve the energy efficiency of their codes. Additionally, 
we are the first to investigate the energy consumption of smartphones in the con­
152
nected standby mode. We also study the network performance of the wireless 
LAN, which is another popular communication approach employed on pervasive 
computing systems. Proposed access point selection algorithm can help to save 
power and secure the communication. Lastly, we propose a new security scheme 
for IMDs. An external device is introduced to act as a security proxy for the IMD 
inside the patient's body. The advantage of this design is that the patient's safety is 
still effectively protected in unexpected situations. In order to apply this scheme in 
the real world, we solve two challenging problems, secure key pairing without any 
prior knowledge and defense against powerful spoofing attacks.
From our studies we also derive some valuable knowledge that may benefit 
the general research area of pervasive computing. First, our new power model­
ing method provides the necessary tool and foundation for energy issues on all 
battery-powered devices. Second, as the first investigation of the sleeping mode 
on smartphones, our findings are helpful to research that explores comprehensive 
energy solutions for pervasive computing systems. Third, our solution for IMD se­
curity can be the framework to manage and protect various similar devices as well. 
We hope our research experience can help shed light on intriguing studies in the 
future.
In summary, we improve the energy efficiency of power-hungry pervasive com­
puting systems and extend their battery lifetime; we also enhance the security 
mechanism of other resource-limited personal mobile devices in order to protect 
valuable and sensitive information. Our research efforts advance existing perva­
sive computing systems and can help design the next generation of pervasive com­
puting systems.
In the future, we will continue to work on the security and energy problems of 
smartphones. The specifications of smartphones keep changing, e.g., from single 
core to multiple cores. Complicated hardware means simple power models are
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unable to capture all consumption variations. We would therefore like to research 
these emerging hardware and provide more accurate estimations of power con­
sumption. Additionally, we want to enable the ” Bring-Your-Own-Devices" paradigm 
by enforcing strong isolation of system activities in real time.
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